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Abstract  
 
The aim of this study was to examine Rawls’s theory of international justice. Rawls 
argues that the principles presented in the Law of Peoples are universally acceptable, 
and this was tested by an empirical survey. Moreover, it was examined whether his 
theory is well-founded and sound. The questionnaire based on Rawls’s theory was 
distributed to university students in 12 countries. The data was examined with logistic 
regression analysis and consensus analysis. The study was begun in autumn 1999 and 
brought to a conclusion in 2001. 
 
Altogether 271 students in the following 7 countries answered to the questionnaire: 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Germany, USA and Tanzania. It was concluded 
that the Law of Peoples did not convince the informants. However, the small sample 
size and the method of collecting the data were not fully reliable. Hence, further study 
is needed in order to conclude whether Rawls’s theory actually is universal. 
 
We questioned the smoothness and consistency of Law of Peoples. Rawls’s theory 
begins in an agreement between liberal societies. Then Rawls asks on which 
principles non-liberal societies could agree. However, he continues that all later 
agreements are subordinated to earlier ones. Hence, the theory is not consistent 
because a universally acceptable theory of justice cannot be based on privileged, 
liberal ideas. 
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Tiivistelmä  
 
Tutkielmassa tutkittiin John Rawlsin kansainvälistä oikeudenmukaisuutta käsittelevää 
teoriaa. Rawlsin mukaan teoriassa esitetyt kansainvälisen oikeuden mukaisuuden 
periaatteet ovat yleismaailmallisesti hyväksyttäviä, mitä tutkittiin empiirisellä 
tutkimuksella. Myös teorian johdonmukaisuutta selvitettiin kriittisesti tarkastelemalla 
teorian logiikkaa. Empiirinen tutkimus toteutettiin kyselylomakkeella, joka jaettiin 
opiskelijoille 12 maassa. Aineistoa tutkittiin logistisella regressio analyysillä ja 
konsensus analyysillä. Tutkimus aloitettiin syksyllä 1999 ja saatettiin päätökseen 
2001. 
 
Kyselyyn vastasi 271 opiskelijaa 7 eri maasta – Suomi, Ruotsi, Norja, Puola, Saksa, 
USA ja Tansania. Rawlsin teoria ei vakuuttanut informantteja. Aineisto oli pieni ja 
kyselylomake koettiin ongelmalliseksi, minkä takia vastausta teorian 
yleismaailmallisesta hyväksyttävyydestä pitää hakea lisätutkimuksella. 
 
Kun teoriaa tarkasteltiin, löydettiin epäjohdonmukaisuuksia. Rawlsin mukaan 
sopimukset ovat alisteisessa suhteessa aikaisempiin sopimuksiin. Tämän takia 
myöhemmin solmittujen sopimusten sopimusala on rajoitettu. Jälkimmäisen 
alkutilanteen sopimusosapuolet, ei-liberaalit yhteiskunnat eivät voi vapaasti päättää 
heitä koskevista oikeudenmukaisuusperiaatteista, koska aikaisempi sopimus 
liberaalien yhteiskuntien tekemänä rajoittaa heitä. Rawlsin teoria ei ole 
johdonmukainen, koska universaali oikeudenmukaisuus ei voi perustua etuoikeuden 
omaaviin liberaaleihin periaatteisiin. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Justice is about each getting what he or she is due and about treating individuals fairly 
and impartially. Alike cases are to be treated in the same way. The central problem is: 
which cases are alike?1 Justice is a trait of individuals, a property of human 
communities and of the international community. This study deals with the concept of 
international justice. 
 
International justice deals with such issues as justice of going to war (jus ad bellum), 
justice in war (jus in bello), just grounds for intervention and economic sanctions. The 
questions of global environmental protection and foreign aid are examined. Moreover, 
it is asked what is owed to future generations. The discourse of international justice 
also examines the rights of individuals, e.g. to which political, social, cultural rights 
individuals are considered to be entitled.  
 
In 1971 the philosopher, Professor John Rawls constructed his famous theory of 
justice titled Justice As Fairness. It deals with justice as the property of communities. 
The theory has received much attention and aroused the interest of many 
philosophers. Justice As Fairness is one of the most important theories in English 
language philosophy. Rawls extends the concept of justice to international relations in 
the theory titled Law of Peoples, which was initially presented in On Human Rights 
(1993). Rawls revised and extended his theory of international justice in Law of 
Peoples (1999) and it has already received the attention of academics. Sihvola (2000) 
writes in his article that Law of Peoples will be one of the most important books about 
international justice. This study examines and analyses the initial version of Law of 
Peoples because the study was already going on when the new version was published. 
 
The Law of Peoples is not the first theory, nor the only one that deals with 
international ethics. Hence, other views and schools of thought will be introduced 
before the presentation of the Law of Peoples. In the course of introduction we shall 
also see how the Law of Peoples is linked to other theories. 
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The study proceeds as follows. First, other views on international ethics are presented. 
Then Rawls’s theories are described. It is necessary to look at Justice As Fairness and 
its method because the method of justifying the principles of international justice is 
the same, although the scope of justice is different. Then the statistical survey and its 
results are presented. Rawls claims that his theory is universally applicable, which is 
tested with an empirical study. The last part of this study discusses statistical findings 
and the argumentation for and against the Law of Peoples. Finally, the question of 
why it makes sense to study a normative theory by empirical means is discussed. 
 
 
1.1 Realism 
 
According to realism, the international arena is an anarchistic place. There are no 
rules and no sovereign to uphold peace (see Kegley 1995, 4). The most important task 
of states is to pursue power. The concept of interest defined as power is the key to 
understanding the conduct of states and explaining international relations. Moral 
considerations are not relevant when politically successful policies are planned. The 
existence of morality is not denied but its efficiency and relevance are. Realism holds 
that there are no right or wrong ideologies. Hence, it is dangerous and irrational to act 
in accordance with any moral code and therefore states may pursuit their goals with 
any means. The consequent anarchy means unpredictability and violence. Therefore, 
it is rational to build up more military power in order to protect the right to 
inviolability.  
 
As Amstutz (1999, 59) states, realism is the oldest ethical tradition of international 
relations. The first book that dealt with the topic was History of the Peloponnesian 
War by Thucydides. However, other philosophers have also contributed to the 
doctrine - Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince ([1513]1993), Hans Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations (1963) and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan ([1651]1994) are 
some examples. In particular, the Hobbesian state of nature explains realism’s view 
on international relations. Some core ideas of Hobbes’s main work, Leviathan, are 
presented below. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 More about the concept of justice and its central problem see Feinberg 1973 and The Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy 1995. 
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Hobbes describes the state of nature where there is no authority to promulgate rules. 
Consequently, morally good and benevolent actions are not rational in the state of 
nature. Hence, it is considered that the state of nature explains international politics 
because there is no authority over states. Hobbes wrote Leviathan as prose but his 
ideas are usually simplified and presented with the help of the game theory. Let us see 
how the game theory has been used by several academics to describe the Hobbesian 
state of nature (see Boomin-Vail 1994, 126; Curley 1994, xxiv-xxv; Kavka 1986, 110-
111). 
 
  B  
  I)  II)  
A I)  3.3 1.4 
 II)  4.1 2.2 
 
    Figure 1. Prisoners’ dilemma. 
 
The game is called the prisoner’s dilemma. There are two actors in the game, whom 
the capital letters refer to. The roman numbers refer to the choices that the actors have 
- I refers to co-operation, i.e. actors shut up, and II refers to co-operation with the 
police. The pairs of numbers indicate the benefit for the actors. The first number 
indicates the benefit of A and the second that of B. The higher the number, the better 
off the actor is. The context of the game is a prison where the actors (i.e. prisoners) 
are interrogated. The actors are not aware of each other’s answers.  
 
Each actor acts rationally and for his own good. When both actors choose I they get a 
good benefit because the police have no aggravating evidence against them. However, 
the actors cannot be certain that they will both choose I (because they are interrogated 
in separated cells). If they choose differently, the one choosing I gets the least benefit 
when the one choosing II gets the most benefit. The one choosing I decides to shut up 
and the actor choosing II makes a deal with the police. He tells the police about the 
crime and gets away with a shorter sentence. Choice I means risk. Hence, choice II is 
the dominant strategy.  
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In the context of the state of nature the result is war. The actors in the state of nature 
cannot be certain whether others choose peace (I) or war (II). If the actors could trust 
each other and thus choose I, peace would be possible. However, the war of all 
against all is inevitable in the state of nature because of man’s nature and the lack of 
mutual trust. The actors know that others also seek power and glory. The desire for 
power is never-ending and it will cease only in death (Hobbes [1651]1994, x/1, 50). 
Therefore man seeks for glory and in the state of nature it is attained in battlefields. 
With glory man can avoid battles and thus preserves his own life, and man is highly 
interested in self-preservation. Man acts for his own good and all his voluntary actions 
are based on self-interested aims, and that is why the actors may take each other’s life 
if it serves their goals. In addition, the actors are more or less equal in terms of 
physical strength and skills. Thus, the most rational way to survive is to attack before 
others (II). However, because all the actors are rational every one of them follows the 
same chain of reasoning, which leads to war. In the international arena it is more 
prudent to be self-interested than benevolent, as the Hobbesian state of nature shows. 
 
According to Hobbes there is no morality in the state of nature. Acts are not right or 
wrong. They just are. 
 
”To this war of every man against every man, this is also consequent: nothing 
can be unjust.” (Hobbes [1651]1994, xiii/13, 78) 
 
”… it followeth that in such condition every man has right to everything, even 
to another’s body.” (ibid, xiv/4, 80) 
 
The prevailing anarchy makes it unprofitable to follow any moral code. Actually, 
Hobbes does not deny the existence of morality and the capability of men to act in a 
morally acceptable way. According to the Hobbesian chain of reasoning, man acts 
morally but it is not rational in the state of nature to do so. Moral behaviour is not 
rational because there is no authority to set the rules and morality needs to be secured 
by a supreme authority (see Räikkä 1994, 124). This is why the actors decide to give 
up the state of nature and to make a social contract in order to establish a state. But as 
long as there is no guard for actors, moral conduct is not possible. Therefore, realists 
generally uphold this argument: since the states are not willing to give up their 
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sovereignty and there is no supranational actor regulating international politics, moral 
behaviour is not a prudent choice.  
 
The school of realism does not deny the possibility of morality, only its rationality. 
Rationality and the will to power are the two key-elements of the realist theory. As 
Rosenthal (1995, 318) puts it, egoistic behaviour is the only reasonable conduct for a 
realist. International actors should not found their foreign policies on the moral basis 
but on the prospect of gaining power. In short, there is no right or wrong, just 
aspirations for power. 
 
 
1.2 Idealism 
 
An idealist argues that human beings and states are not interested in power and self-
preservation only. We can judge the conduct of states on the basis of morality. Evil 
and inappropriate behaviour in international politics can be avoided by co-operating 
and forming principles such as human rights. Wrong and corrupted institutions cause 
misery. In addition, it is argued that there is the universal principle of conscience 
whose activity in the affairs of human life is entirely indifferent to time and place (see 
Robinson 1982, 10).  
 
As an example I present one theory that illustrates idealism. Kant’s Perpetual Peace 
(1795) presents idealism’s aspiration for peace and harmony and belief in human 
goodness. According to Kant morality consists of a totality of laws according to 
which we ought to act (see Kant [1795]1989, 47). If we have acknowledged this 
concept of duty, it would be contradictory to claim that we are not to do our duty. In 
such a case this concept would drop itself out of the morality. This is why Kant argues 
that there is no conflict between morality and politics. Morality is a limiting condition 
of politics, and hence, we ought to choose political maxims that are consistent with 
morality.  
 
Even though Kant argues that man is capable of goodness, he does not mean that man 
is totally good. There will always be a conflict between morality and the selfish 
propensity of men. This conflict works as a whetstone, and it is important to 
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acknowledge the selfishness of man so that we can detect and conquer the evil in us. 
Because there is no conflict between politics and morality, we can seek perpetual 
peace. 
 
Kant argues that perpetual peace is possible only if states’ governments are organised 
as republics where executive and legislative powers are separated. The form of 
government ought to be republican because it is based on the freedom of citizens, on 
the citizens’ dependency on legislation as subjects and on the equality of citizens. The 
republic is the very foundation of all civil constitutions, and through the republic we 
still have hope for peace. The reason why republicanism can lead to peace is the 
power of citizens. If it is required that the opinion of citizens is asked in order to make 
the decision on war and peace, it is more probable that they will choose peace and 
consequently avoid the calamities of war than look for miseries. The whole people 
pay the costs of war. Other forms of government do not require the ruler to sacrifice 
his pleasures and comforts and therefore it is easy to start warring with other states. 
Moreover, it is important that legislative and executive powers are separated, which is 
the case in republics. This guarantees that there is not only one actor to hold the 
power, which would be despotism. 
 
If states ought to be republics then the co-operation of states should take place under a 
federation. Individuals decide to establish a state in order to protect their vital interests 
and to get out of outlawed conditions where war is present. Kant writes that a 
completely lawful constitution and commonwealth can alone be established by an 
original contract (see Kant 1999, 104). This is why states act in the same way, but the 
way to organise coexistence of states is different. The nature of state calls for a 
superior, the state, and an inferior, the citizens. It would contradict the nature of states 
if there were a supranational actor because states cannot be inferior but equal. States 
do not want to give up their freedom and sovereignty. Therefore the rights of nations 
should be weighed against each other, and that is only possible if the form of the 
coexistence of states is a federation.  
 
The aim of a federation is to protect the liberty of the state, the liberty to be free. The 
agreement of peace should not be called a treaty of peace but a league of peace 
because many peace treaties have been done and none of them have lasted forever. 
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Peace treaties merely offer a break for the parties of war, whereas a league of peace is 
to stop wars for good. Kant ([1795]1989, 31) continues that according to reason there 
is no other way to get rid of lawless conditions leading to war than a federation of free 
states. Like individuals who give up their lawless freedom and adjust themselves to 
the constraints of public law, states should organise their relations in the same way. 
Moreover, it is in the nature of the republic to do so.  
 
How can perpetual peace be guaranteed? According to Kant (ibid, 35) nature 
guarantees it. The machinelike course of nature turns individuals’ conflicts into 
harmony and peace. Before describing the ways of nature to guarantee the perpetual 
peace, Kant (ibid, 36) explains the conditions that nature has created. First, people can 
live everywhere in the world. Second, nature has chosen war as a way to spread 
people all over the world and to keep people in their abodes even against their will. 
Third, nature has forced people into mutual lawful relations. 
 
After describing the conditions Kant explains how nature guarantees perpetual peace 
so that all three phases of public law - civil law, the law of nations, and the law of 
world citizenship – are taken into consideration. Disharmonious domestic affairs turn 
into harmonious civil life because of the coexistence with other states. This 
coexistence is seen as oppressive and also as a threat to the security of the state. In 
order to secure their aim to survive, individuals put conflicting issues aside and co-
operate. Thus, individuals establish a republic because it is seen as the most rational 
and efficient way to protect their state from any external threat.  
 
How to establish a state when man has selfish inclinations? It is a question of 
organising opposing inclinations in such a way that they destroy or at least moderate 
the negative effect of each other. This is possible within reason, and only through a 
republic can we establish a constitution in such a way that opposing, selfish motives 
check one another. The result is that man’s public conduct makes it clear that there are 
no opposing intentions at all. 
 
The leaders of states want peace in spite of the state of nature, but they want to 
achieve it being the sole ruler of the world, i.e. conquering the whole world. Nature 
has, however, organised the conditions of peace in other ways since there are different 
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languages and religions. Even though these differences can offer pretexts for war and 
hatred, Kant writes that the progress of civilisation and the harmonisation of 
principles of states finally lead to peaceful agreement, i.e. the league of peace. There 
is another reason for peaceful agreement – money. The spirit of commerce and the 
power of money (the greatest power after war according to Kant) take the upper hand 
in every state. In order to keep up good commerce, to gain more monetary power and 
to prevent wars states cherish peaceful mutual relations. These are the ways of nature 
to guarantee peace. 
 
Next we shall see what principles and laws Kant presents for the league of peace. 
According to the first law the treaty on peace shall not be implemented if it includes 
secret reservations for war. The treaty is to condemn and prevent all wars for good. 
Secondly, states cannot be property of another by exchange, purchase or gift. The 
state is a community of humans who command themselves. Thirdly, permanent 
armies must be abolished in the course of time because they always pose a threat to 
other states. Armies only encourage rearmament. Moreover, it is contrary to our 
conception of human value that people are hired to kill and fight. This would imply 
that people are only tools and machines for states.  
 
Debts should be used for domestic policies and not for foreign policy. Loaned money 
is not to be spent on military equipment but building infrastructure and the like. 
According to the fifth law violent intervention is forbidden. States have no right to 
intervene in a civil war where a nation fights for its independence, but if a state has 
already ceased to exist and new states have arisen, other states may assist these new 
members of the international community. If a war has broken out, according to the 
sixth law states must refrain from any actions that might endanger mutual trust 
between the parties after the war. States must not hire assassins or poisoners. It is 
forbidden to breach capitulation and to provoke treason because these means are 
dishonourable. These dishonourable means destroy the mutual trust that is needed for 
a pact of peace. War is only a way to defend one’s right with force and there are no 
rightful parties until the war has ceased. In other words, the result of the war 
determines who was right and who was wrong. 
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There is one more definition of perpetual peace, that of “the conditions of universal 
hospitality”. This entails the right not to be treated as an enemy when entering the 
territory of another state. A stranger can be asked to leave without causing harm but 
any violent acts against the peaceful stranger are forbidden. The stranger may only 
demand the right of a temporary visit. The right is based on the idea that nobody and 
everyone own the surface of the earth.  
 
Kant’s theory of everlasting peace is a good example of idealism. By rules and certain 
principles states organise their relations to each other in a peaceful manner. The 
sovereignty of states is respected but there are policies that are not permissible. Kant 
sees that humans will strive for peace. Firstly, humans get out of the anarchic situation 
by establishing a state. Then the states regulate their actions by a peace treaty, and the 
aim is again to get out of the situation that may lead to war.  
 
However, idealism is not only expressed by theories such as Perpetual Peace. There 
are many conventions that aim to regulate international relations. Therefore, it is 
argued that humans do believe in goodness and possibility of peace (see Donnelly 
1999, 64). The first convention that forbade war as a tool of international relations 
was The Briand - Kellog Pact in 1928. In the first peace conference in the Hague 
(1899) the use of so-called dumdum bullets was forbidden, and after eight years it was 
agreed that it was necessary to declare a war (Hakapää 1995, 380 & 388). The use of 
chemical weapons was prohibited in the 1920’s, which was followed 70 years later by 
the convention on denying their production.  
 
Not only the conduct in war is regulated. Also individuals have got some attention on 
the agenda. Plenty of conventions on human rights have been agreed on and signed, 
which also speaks for idealism. The first one to regulate human rights was the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It was presented in 1948 by the 
United Nations. This declaration was followed by conventions in 1966 that dealt with 
civil and political (ICCPR), and economical, social and cultural rights (ICESCR). 
Within the Council of Europe the European convention of human rights was signed in 
1950. There are hundreds of conventions and agreements concerning human rights 
(see Ihmisoikeusliitto RY 1995). In addition, the United Nations has formulated 
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strategies for humanitarian aid. Several policies have been implemented among 
national states in order to aid poorer countries. 
 
 
1.3 Relativism 
 
The possibility of universally applicable moral norms expressed by conventions such 
as UDHR is denied by relativism. After the Second World War the United Nations 
asked an American anthropologist to examine the possibility of universal human 
rights. Anthropologist Melville Herskovits replied that it is impossible to construct 
universal human rights on the basis of one culture. Such abstractions as right and 
wrong and abnormal and normal are absorbed as a person learns the ways of the group 
into which he is born (see Herskovits 1973, 15). Relativists emphasise that UDHR is 
not universal, but western. The human rights presented by the United Nations are 
meaningless to the third world because the values and moral norms expressed in the 
declaration are not shared by African cultures. Relativism denies any universal values. 
 
 “For if right and wrong are completely determined by the given moral 
code of particular time and place, and if moral codes vary from time to 
time and place to place, it would seem that there are no unchanging 
cross-cultural principles that could constitute an ideal ethical system 
applicable to everyone.” (Taylor 1999, 32) 
 
Taylor points out that there are no universally applicable principles if relativism is 
right in its conviction. There is no absolute international concept of justice but many 
relative ones. Therefore the actors of international politics may pursue their interests 
in accordance with their own rules of conduct. Relativism is often resorted to in order 
to put forward arguments for self-interested behaviour in international politics as 
Nagengast and Turner (1997, 270) point out. We need to examine relativism a bit 
more.  
 
Taylor (1999, 33-37) presents two categories of relativism – descriptive and 
normative relativism. Descriptive relativism is based on the fact that moral values are 
relative to a given culture. Hence there cannot be any universal code of morality. 
Firstly, there are the facts of cultural variability. For instance, Benedict (1999, 29-30) 
refers to a study of an island in Northwest Melanesia, where a tribe’s traits and 
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customs would seem abnormal to us, but perfectly normal within their culture. For us 
(the western cultures) the members of this tribe are paranoiac. There are no parties, no 
sharing of food, no cooking without supervision because it is believed that people 
poison each other, take each other’s lives and cast black magic on one another. 
Persons who are helpful and kind are considered to be crazy. The death of a person 
can be compensated with a death of somebody else. For instance, if the daughter of a 
chief is killed, the chief may pick up someone at random and slay him without the rest 
of the tribe considering his act abnormal. 
 
Psychological studies have also been used to argue for descriptive relativism. The 
values of individuals reflect those of his group. In other words, our values are learned 
from the group where we belong. There are no universal values because all cultures 
have their own values. Our beliefs about what is right and wrong are due to our 
bringing-up in one particular culture. Taylor (1999, 33) points out that according to 
descriptive relativism: 
 
“Our very conscience itself is formed by the internalizing of the 
sanctions used by our society to support its moral norms.” 
 
Benedict (1999, 31) concurs: 
 
“Mankind has always preferred to say, “It is morally good”, rather than 
“It is habitual”, and the fact of this preference is matter enough for a 
critical science of ethics. But historically the two phrases are 
synonymous.” 
 
Finally, it has been argued that the fact that most people are ethnocentric proves that 
descriptive realism is true. People think that the true morality is their own, which 
leads to intolerance and closed societies. In other words, other people are blind to 
their evil customs and their wrong moral values. 
 
There is another kind of relativism – normative. It is not based on facts, as Taylor 
(1999, 36) points out, but on a normative claim. It is argued that moral norms are 
valid and right only in the society that has adopted them. What we believe to be right 
can be considered wrong in other societies, and we have no right to judge them. Our 
moral norms are applicable only to our society. The universal validity of moral values 
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is denied. Let us take an example. Even the call for tolerance is culturally determined. 
In some societies the tolerance of other societies is considered to be the right thing to 
do, but in other societies not. Moreover, if we claim that every culture has the right to 
its own cultural values, we are right only within our own culture. The same claim 
might not be morally right in other cultures. Societies cannot judge one another 
because their moral judgements are valid and applicable only in their culture. If we 
argue that a certain set of human rights is universal and each person is entitled to it, it 
is true only within our culture.  
 
When the empirical findings of descriptive realism are attached to the claims of 
normative relativism, it can be concluded that universally valid moral values do not 
exist. Since moral norms vary from time to time, place-to-place and culture-to-culture, 
and since our beliefs about what is right and wrong are valid only in our culture, we 
have no arguments for universal moral values. To conclude, according to relativism 
there is no universally applicable concept of justice. 
 
There are certain problems in normative relativism. If normative relativism is true we 
cannot accept any kind of intervention and war. Even if we notice that our 
neighbouring society S violates the human rights of a group of its citizens we cannot 
intervene. Let us suppose that this particular society S executes all Christians in its 
territory. Every Christian is put in a concentration camp, and finally killed and 
burned. The life of every Christian would be a misery in society S. Relativists would 
argue that the violation of human rights is wrong only within our culture since our 
moral norms are applicable only to our culture. The violation of human rights may be 
totally right in society S. Human rights such as ours may not even exist there, and thus 
we cannot judge society S. Could we accept the claim of normative relativism and not 
intervene? Most of us would argue no. For instance, if normative relativism were 
accepted, the actions of Nazis would have been totally acceptable. The genocide that 
took place in the Nazi society could be considered right however wrong it seems to 
us.  
 
There is another problem in normative relativism – what is the community which it 
refers to? Is it national states, or perhaps groups with different identities? For instance, 
there are Finns, Swedish, Lapps, Somalis, Gypsies, Mormons, Christians, and 
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Muslims within the borders of Finland. We can identify certain cultural properties for 
all of them, and consequently it would be difficult to promulgate laws binding all the 
people within the borders of Finland. Could we judge genital mutilation if it takes 
place in Finland? We could always argue that it is not the concern of others but 
certain African Muslims. Their cultural customs are correct for them, however 
outrageous and criminal they may seem to Finns.  
 
Is it possible to construct a set of human rights that could be accepted by all cultures? 
Is it possible that descriptive realism is mistaken in its view that empirical evidence 
supports its claims? Do cultural differences necessary mean that there are no cross-
cultural values? On the basis of the cross-cultural values we could form the concept of 
international justice, i.e. we could judge actions such as those of Nazis. There is one 
school of thought that considers this possible. According to pluralism we can find 
some values that are shared in every culture, and consequently it is possible to form a 
universally valid concept of international justice. Actually, the search for universal 
human rights has relativistic foundations. We are not to suppose that our values are 
universally applicable. Therefore, we must seek information on values that are shared 
in all cultures. On the basis of that information we could form the concept of 
international justice. The quest for universally applicable human rights and moral 
norms calls for pluralism.2 
 
There is surprisingly little empirical evidence for or against universally valid moral 
norms and human rights as Cohen (1989, 106) points out. This opinion is supported 
by Lagerspetz’s (1996, 7) argument that the theory of international politics is mainly 
based on political philosophy. Moreover, already in the 1940's Herskovits (1973, 14) 
admitted that international data is not available for the discourse on human rights. 
Herskovits wanted empirical evidence against the universality of human rights. 
However, if in fifty years much progress has not been made it is about time to conduct 
an empirical survey on the topic. Cohen argues in his article that anthropological 
research on human rights needs a new approach. Anthropological research has 
focused too much on the theoretical aspect. Moreover, anthropologists have neglected 
                                                           
2 More about pluralism and arguments against relativism see Messer 1997, Taylor 1999, An-Na’im 
1999, Chan 1999, Tatsuo 1999, Charney 1999, Turner 1997, Nagengast 1997, Salmon 1997, Zechenter 
1997, Gellner 1985. 
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the empirical research needed to reply to the question whether universal human rights 
and universal values exist. 
  
”The answer… lies out in the hurly-burly amid the blooming, buzzing 
confusion of real world experience where rights or a sense what is just and 
rights emerge, rather than in the philosopher study.” (Cohen 1989, 106). 
 
Cohen’s view supports my impression that there is a great amount of theoretical 
material on human rights and international justice, but hardly any empirical research. 
 
 
1.4 Purpose and methods 
The purpose of this study is to examine and analyse Rawls’s theory of international 
justice in order to find the core ideas. Moreover, this study aims to judge whether the 
Law of Peoples is well-founded and sound. After finding the testable core of Rawls’s 
theory an empirical survey is conducted in order to see if the principles of 
international justice presented in the Law of Peoples are as universally and generally 
applicable as Rawls claims.  
 
The method is normal conceptual and argument analysis. As Geoffrey Thomas (15, 
2000) puts it, the aim of conceptual analysis is “to pick out the conditions for its 
[concept’s] application”. In addition, Rawls’s arguments are divided into their 
elements, and the views of Rawls are examined against the criteria of adequacy for 
political theories – internal consistency, simplicity, smoothness, metaphysical and 
scientific compatibility, and inter-theoretic support (see ibid, 27). This means that an 
adequate political theory ought not to contain illogical claims, it should have 
qualifications to meet its difficulties, it should fit in our general world-view and with 
“the best science” and it ought to be coherent with other theories that fulfil the same 
criteria. 
 
The data for the empirical survey was collected by distributing a questionnaire to 
university students in 12 countries. The questionnaire was based on the core ideas and 
claims in the Law of Peoples. On the basis of persentage and frequency distribution it 
was examined whether Rawls’s theory of international justice is universally 
applicable or not. Consensus and logistic regression analyses were performed to 
  20
examine there are significant cultural differences, i.e. does cultural background make 
a difference as relativism claims? 
 
 
2 Rawls’s theories 
 
2.1 Method 
 
Rawls aims at constructing a theory of justice. He uses the social contract method that 
was already used by Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes and Kant: 
 
“…A theory of justice that generalizes and carries to a higher level of 
abstraction the traditional conception of the social contract.” (1983, 3) 
 
“…the original position...corresponds to the state of nature in the 
traditional theory of social contract.” (ibid, 12) 
 
Rawls (ibid, 16) writes that “contract” implies a certain level of abstraction. The 
“contract’s” aim is to establish certain moral principles, and Rawls holds that certain 
principles will actually be accepted in the well-defined hypothetical situation. The 
contract, of course, implies consensus because the parties of the contract have 
succeeded in putting aside their conflicting views and, consequently, they have 
attained a view shared by everyone. Both theories, Justice As Fairness and Law Of 
Peoples, begin in an original situation, i.e. state of nature where actors decide which 
principles of justice guide them after the original position. 
 
As the term “hypothetical” suggests, the original position has never taken place. It is a 
way to justify the principles of justice. In real life hypothetical claims are often used 
to justify moral claims. We often pose a hypothetical question to our friend when he 
has performed a morally wrong act, for instance stolen a lollipop: “What if everybody 
acted like you?”. After a while our friend realises why his act was wrong, at least that 
is what we suppose. We answer on his behalf because he is too embarrassed: “The 
world would be completely different if stealing were morally right. There would be no 
binding rules, no personal property. So, do not steal any more”. 
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The actors can be individuals, churches, nations, municipalities, business firms and so 
on (see Rawls 1997). However, in Justice As Fairness the actors are representative 
men who choose the principles of a just society, and in Law of Peoples the 
representatives of societies choosing the principles of a just international community 
of societies. In both theories, mutually self-interested actors try to achieve consensus 
on the principles of justice. They are not willing to sacrifice their interests to others, 
and consequently, they try to achieve a balance between competing claims. 
 
The actors are also rational. As Rawls (1997, 189) points out, rationality is a virtue in 
the original position: the actors are aware of their own interests; they are capable of 
tracing out the consequences of adopting certain principles; they can resist a 
temptation and the enticements of immediate gain; there is no envy. In other words, as 
impartiality is one of the key elements and the actors of the original position are 
rational and self-interested, Rawls’s theories can be regarded as theories of rational 
choice. Decisions are not taken in order to damage other actors but only to attain 
one’s own goals. The actors are roughly equal in power and they all have similar 
abilities to achieve their own ends. Hence, they cannot manipulate or dominate each 
other. They also have more or less similar needs and interests, which makes it 
possible to cooperate. The actors are aware that the decisions they make are binding 
after the original position – there is no going back.  
 
Now we know the characteristics of the actors in the hypothetical original position, 
but we must notice that there are some constraints. The actors do not know how much 
material welfare is appropriate for their ends or what is sufficient to satisfy their 
conceptions of justice (see Rawls 1983, 142). This is why the rational and self-
interested actors always desire more and they are not satisfied with less because there 
is no going back to the original situation.  
 
The members of a society in Justice As Fairness are not aware of their personal traits. 
Rawls says that there is a veil of ignorance that hinders the actors from knowing their 
personal characteristics. The ones choosing the principles of justice of a just society 
are not aware of their status and place in a society, nor of their fortune, abilities and 
intelligence, strength and so on (ibid, 137). The representatives of societies in Law of 
Peoples in turn do not know how rich their societies may be, where they are located, if 
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they are rich in natural resources and if the level of technological development is high 
or low. It follows that the principles that the actors choose are to work in different 
applications and unknown circumstances. The principles should guarantee the actors’ 
interests in any circumstances. 
 
It is important to notice that the relevant principles of justice are chosen under great 
uncertainty and the decisions are irrevocable. This is why all the circumstances after 
the original position should be acceptable to all. In short, we must find the principles 
that are acceptable whether we are rich or poor, bright or dim, male or female. The 
principles of international justice must be acceptable whether your society is rich or 
poor, similarly, technologically advanced or backward, in north or south. Thus the 
actors rationally insure themselves against the worst possible outcome.  
 
 
2.2 Justice As Fairness 
 
In Justice As Fairness Rawls presents the principles that representative men would 
choose for their society. These principles are restrictions on how social institutions are 
to be arranged. They define positions and offices, and assign powers, rights and 
duties. Thus Rawls does not focus on individuals and their claims but on social 
institutions. He defines the concept of justice that is to eliminate arbitrary distinctions 
and to establish a balance between competing claims. 
 
The principles of justice are based on fairness. Rawls claims that fairness is 
fundamental to justice. The concept of fairness relates to right dealing between actors 
who are cooperating with or competing against one another, as in fair games, fair 
competition and fair bargains (see Rawls 1997). Rawls emphasises fairness because it 
does not imply force. The actors in the original position, however self-interested, 
consider the principles fair because they have equal powers to bargain and seek their 
interests.  
 
The principles are fair because every representative man has a conception of 
legitimate claims, which are also reasonable for others to acknowledge. Because the 
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representative men consider the rules of the original position as fair, they have a duty 
to act in accordance with the principles of justice.  
 
According to Rawls, the representative men choose the following two principles for 
the basis of a fair society: 
 
“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty of others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and 
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.” 
    (Rawls 1983, 60) 
 
The first principle grants every member of the society with equal rights to certain 
liberties. The liberties must be as extensive as they can be without conflicting with 
those of others. The representative men choose to be equal in liberties because they do 
not know which position they will hold after the original position. Hence, they 
rationally insure themselves against the worst possible situation. Rawls (ibid, 61) lists 
liberties to which each person has an equal right: the right to political liberty; the 
freedom of speech; the freedom of assembly; the liberty of conscience; the freedom of 
thought; the right to personal property; the freedom from arbitrary arrest.  
 
The second principle applies to the distribution of wealth and income that is attached 
to different positions and offices. The distribution should not to be equal if it is not 
advantageous for all, which also illustrates the representative men’s will to insure 
themselves against the worst possible situation. If inequalities in wealth and income 
make everyone better off, then we have a good and rational reason to distribute goods 
unequally. The latter part (b) of the second principle calls for all the positions and 
offices being open to all in a way that is consistent with the liberties and the 
distribution of goods. Any offices having special benefits must be won in a fair 
competition where contestants are judged on their merits. 
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Clarifications 
According to Rawls (1983, 61) the first principle has priority over the second. The 
priority is to attain conditions that ensure equal liberties to all, and these liberties must 
be always secured even at the expense of a greater social and economic well-being of 
all. We must notice that inequalities are only permissible with respect to the second 
principle. There cannot be inequalities in liberties because the first principle clearly 
requires that each person have equal right to the same set of liberties. Inequalities are 
to be justified in terms of everyone’s prospects.  
 
Rawls emphasises that Justice As Fairness is different from utilitarianism. 
Utilitarianism does not care about how income and wealth is distributed, but about the 
total utility of all persons. Rawls takes a different tack and says that inequalities are 
permissible because they work as incentives and they encourage more efficient 
performance. This is not the whole story, however: 
 
Rawls (1983, 75) insists that the distribution of shares is just if it is beneficial to the 
worst-off person. In other words, inequalities are permissible if the greater 
expectations (concerning the primary goods) of the best-off person contribute to the 
well-being of the worst-off person. The representative men can find themselves in the 
position of a caretaker or of a minister. That is why they seek to maximise the 
expectations of the worst-off person.  
 
Justice As Fairness defines the concept of justice within a democratic, liberal society. 
Actually, Rawls’s theory of social justice has been criticised because it is not 
universal, i.e. cannot be applied in non-liberal societies because it presupposes 
egalitarian principles.  
 
 
2.3 Law of Peoples 
 
Rawls constructed his theory of international justice (Law of Peoples) in 1993. Rawls 
(1993, 51) argues that the Law of Peoples is not an egalitarian, therefore a Western 
theory, because it lacks three elements: the fair value of political liberties, the equality 
of opportunity and the difference principle. By dropping out these principles of social 
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justice Rawls tries to avoid criticism according to which his theory is liberal in 
substance.  
 
The Law of Peoples is constructed on three important elements – (1) a list of basic 
human rights and opportunities, (2) a high priority for these fundamental freedoms 
and (3) some measures assuring the means making effective use of the set of rights. 
The aim of the theory is to construct a political concept of international justice that 
would be generally applicable and accepted by all cultures.  
 
In other words, the Law of Peoples deals with the political morality of international 
relations. However, Rawls (1993, 44) emphasises that his intention is not to answer all 
the questions about international justice. The questions about what is owed to animals, 
nature and those who have no capabilities for co-operating members of society are not 
answered. The Law of Peoples deals with political justice only, and one should realise 
that the 
“… idea of political justice does not cover everything and we should not 
expect it to.” (1993, 45) 
 
Although the Law of Peoples is “universal in its reach”, “universality” does not mean 
that all questions on all subjects are answered. It merely refers to constructivism, i.e. 
to the social contract method. A theory based on constructivism does no apply to all 
subjects and to all issues, but only the relevant ones.  
 
“Each time the constructivist procedure is modified to fit the subject in 
question.” 
“…a constructivist liberal doctrine is universal in its reach once it is 
extended to give principles to all politically relevant subjects, including 
law of peoples for the most comprehensive subject, the political society 
of peoples.” (1993, 46) 
 
If Rawls succeeds in answering all relevant questions about international relations his 
theory is universal in its reach. In Justice As Fairness Rawls presented the principles 
of a just society and now he constructs a theory of international justice based on the 
same method. For a constructivist there are several subjects, cases, and there is not 
one grand theory that could give answers to all the situations, but there is one method 
that can give answers to different situations (1993, 47).  
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Justice As Fairness and Law of Peoples together form one single theory of justice. 
The Law of Peoples extends the scope of justice to international relations. In Justice 
As Fairness Rawls (1983, 8) already dealt with international justice and referred to 
this sequence. Therefore, it seems that Rawls has always aimed at constructing a 
theory of international justice.  
 
First Rawls constructs a well-ordered, political society of democratic societies, after 
which, in the second step, he takes the non-liberal societies into consideration. He 
shows why non-liberal societies would also accept the rules that were constructed in 
the first step (by democratic societies).  
 
At this point it is necessary to explain what Rawls means by liberal and non-liberal 
societies. Liberal, democratic societies are the ones having adopted the liberal 
conception of justice as it is illustrated in Justice as Fairness. Basically liberal 
societies are Western. Rawls (1983, 43) calls non-liberal societies hierarchical 
societies. Hierarchical societies are often religious and the state and religion are not 
separated. They are peaceful and non-expansionist and their legal system satisfy the 
conditions of legitimacy in the eyes of their own people. Moreover, hierarchical 
societies honor human rights (ibid, 43). 
 
Why does Rawls begin with liberal societies? Rawls admits that (ibid, 50) he cannot 
give any clear answer. He only argues that he had already begun with Justice As 
Fairness and therefore it is reasonable to continue from where Justice As Fairness 
ended. The societal level theory (Justice As Fairness) is considered to be sound and 
flawless, and now he simply expands this theory to the international level.  
 
Rawls (ibid, 66) admits, however, that in a global original position the basis of the 
Law of Peoples would be too narrow because liberal ideas could not be used. It would 
be troublesome to use liberal ideas in an all-inclusive original position because the 
theory would be Western in its origin. Moreover, the theory should not only be based 
on logic and moral philosophy. 
 
Rawls considers the liberal principles of justice similar to, but more general than the 
ones presented in Justice As Fairness as an apt starting point for the Law of Peoples. 
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Therefore it seems that the Law of Peoples defends the universality of some liberal 
principles formed in Rawls’s former theory. Rawls writes that without extending the 
liberal principles of justice to the Law of Peoples, 
 
“…a liberal conception of political justice would appear to be historicist and 
to apply only to societies whose political institutions and culture are liberal.” 
(ibid, 44) 
 
 
 
Liberal societies 
In the original position the representatives of democratic societies are similar to the 
representative men in Justice As Fairness - equal, free and rational, and they decide 
for appropriate reasons (see 1993, 54). The aim of the representatives of democratic 
societies is to secure the fundamental interests that are in accordance with their 
domestic conception of justice. 
 
Rawls (ibid, 54) argues that the veil of ignorance prevents the representatives of 
democratic societies from knowing the conditions of their societies. The size of the 
territory or that of the population is not known. Even though they know that their 
society is democratic they do not know the technological level or the amount of 
natural resources of their societies. Because of these insecure conditions the 
representatives of democratic societies would insure their societies against the worst 
possible situation. 
 
The representatives of democratic societies would choose some principles of justice 
and decide to create some co-operative association among democratic peoples. 
However, the result would not be a world state because it would not be coherent 
enough and it would result in global despotism (see ibid, 55). Some ethnic or religious 
groups would want to create their own states, which would undermine the existence 
and the efficacy of the world state.  
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Rawls (ibid, 55) presents a set of principles of international justice that democratic 
societies would agree upon: 
  
1. Peoples (as organised by their governments) are free and independent and 
their freedom is to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are equal and parties to their own agreements 
3. Peoples have the right of self-determination but no right to war. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
6. Peoples are to observe certain specified restriction on the conduct of war 
(assumed to be in self-defence). 
7. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
 
 
As Rawls (1993, 55) himself points out, some principles might be superfluous for 
democratic societies. These kinds of principles constitute the charter of the democratic 
society, and therefore they may be superfluous for liberal societies. However, those 
principles are necessary because all societies are not democratic.  
 
Rawls (ibid, 56) states that the list is incomplete. Democratic societies would establish 
some international organisations for co-operative actions, such as fair trade. The 
possibility of draughts and famine would also be taken into consideration and 
therefore some provisions for mutual aid would be established. Moreover, if feasible, 
and for Rawls (ibid, 56) it should be, the basic needs of citizens of democratic 
societies should be met. However, Rawls does not clarify how federations, 
organisations and provisions for mutual aid would be created and established.  
 
For Rawls it is evident that democratic societies accept the principles presented in the 
Law of Peoples because the liberal principles of justice regulating the basic structures 
of democratic societies work as an apt starting point for the Law of Peoples. In his 
theory of social justice Rawls stated that the conditions of the original position are fair 
if the formed principles matched with our considered judgements. This time Rawls 
argues that his principles of international justice are justified in the case of democratic 
societies if their citizens accept the principles of the Law of Peoples. This is one more 
reason to conduct an empirical survey. 
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Extension to non-liberal societies 
The second step is to extend the Law of Peoples to non-liberal, well-ordered 
hierarchical societies. As Rawls states, it is important to show why and how non-
liberal societies can accept the same principles as liberal ones. 
 
“It [Law of Peoples] specifies the kind of society of well-ordered societies all 
people should want and it sets the regulative end for their foreign policies.” 
(1993, 60) 
 
Rawls (ibid, 61) presents three conditions that hierarchical societies have to meet. 
First, hierarchical societies must be peaceful, i.e. use peaceful means, such as 
diplomacy and trade, to attain their goals in international relations. If hierarchical 
societies, influenced by a comprehensive religious doctrine, seek wider influence, 
they have to do so by peaceful means. A religious doctrine shall not be expansionist. 
In addition, the civic order and the independence of other peoples must be respected. 
 
The second requirement concerns the system of law. The system of law ought to 
impose duties and obligations on all people within the society, and it should be guided 
by the common good conception of justice (see ibid, 61). The common good 
conception of justice requires that the fundamental needs of all be taken into account. 
There are no people whose interests are not important. Judges should act in 
accordance with the common good conception of justice, and therefore the system of 
law could also be used to defend the state’s injunctions. Judges must listen to all 
different voices in order to secure the fundamental interests of all. 
 
Rawls (ibid, 62) points out that in non-liberal societies citizens are not seen as 
individuals as in democratic societies but as members of a larger group. Members 
have certain obligations and duties for the group, i.e. for the society. The members of 
hierarchical societies have not the same freedom of speech as those of liberal 
societies. Therefore, consultation hierarchy, a group of representative bodies 
guarantee that different voices are heard, also those of dissents. Rawls continues that 
government has the obligation to hear different voices, also dissents, and give a 
conscientious response. This comes down to the idea of the common good conception 
of justice, i.e. that fundamental interests of all are taken into account. If members’ 
dissenting opinions are not heard out, it is impossible to secure their interests. 
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Rawls continues that the consultation hierarchy securing the interest of all the 
elements of the society and the common good conception of justice together guarantee 
certain minimum rights to the members of non-liberal societies. 
 
“… certain minimum rights to subsistence and security (the right to life), to 
liberty (freedom from slavery, serfdom and forceful occupations and 
(personal) property, as well as to formal equality as expressed by the rules of 
natural justice.” (1993, 62) 
 
The third requirement for hierarchical society is that it respects the basic human 
rights. Rawls (1993, 63) argues that the second requirement, the common good 
conception of justice and the consultation hierarchy, rules out the violation of the third 
requirement. If a hierarchical society wants to take the interests of all into account, it 
needs to form a consultation hierarchy. The basic human rights express the basic 
interests of all, although Rawls does not say this directly. He only argues that to 
satisfy the last requirement, that of respecting human rights, the society needs to 
impose duties and rights on all its members, and in order to impose duties and rights 
on all members, a consultation hierarchy is needed.  
 
                  State/church 
 
 
        Interests of all 
 
    Basic human rights 
Consultation hierarchy   
     
    Fundamental interests of all 
             Dissents 
 
 
  The members of a non-liberal society 
 
 
                          Figure 2. Consultation hierarchy and the interests of all. 
 
Rawls (ibid, 60) emphasises that the society does not need to be liberal in order to 
fulfil these requirements. The aim is not to show how the hierarchical society and its 
social order should be constructed and established. Rawls simply gives some 
conditions that a hierarchical society must meet in order to be a member of the society 
of well-ordered societies. 
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Rawls (ibid, 64) continues that societies, also hierarchical ones, care about security as 
assured by laws against wars and aggression. War and aggression would be denied 
because the religious doctrine of a hierarchical society is not expansionist, and every 
society wants to be free and equal with others. The benefits of co-operation, for 
instance in trade, and aid in times of famine and draught would be also sought by 
hierarchical societies. Human rights would be endorsed because the system of law is 
based on the common good conception of justice, i.e. the interests of all are taken into 
account. The system of law imposes duties and obligations to all the members of the 
society, and the consultation hierarchy is a device that ensures that also dissents are 
heard. Basically, the key point in Rawls’s argument is that the system of law is based 
on the common good conception of justice. Because of the common good conception 
of justice hierarchical societies would accept the same principles and human rights as 
liberal ones. However, Rawls does not present any arguments for the fact that also 
hierarchical societies would accept the Law of Peoples as justified, but he  
 
“…simply add[s], without argument or evidence, but hoping it seems plausible 
that these societies [hierarchical] will honor a just law of peoples for much 
the same reasons liberal societies do…”. (1993, 67) 
 
 
Human rights 
Human rights play an important role in the Law of Peoples. In spite of their 
importance, Rawls presents only six human rights that all people can endorse 
whatever their cultural background may be. Rawls (1993, 68) emphasises that human 
rights are not dependent on any particular moral or philosophical doctrine and that 
human rights only express the minimum standard of well-ordered political institutions 
of a people being a member of the just society of peoples. Violation of these rights is 
a serious matter both for hierarchical and liberal peoples. 
 
Rawls’s (ibid, 62 & 68) universal human rights are as follows: the right to life and 
security, to personal property, to freedom of religion and conscience, emigration, to 
formal equality and to liberty. These rights are accepted both by liberal and non-
liberal peoples. For liberal, mainly Western societies these rights can be superfluous, 
and therefore Rawls puts forward arguments why non-liberal peoples would accept 
them.  
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Human rights will also uphold in the case of hierarchical peoples due to the common 
good conception of justice and the system of law (see ibid, 68-69). A society does not 
need to be liberal to accept these requirements. In a way they are politically neutral. It 
is only required that citizens who are fully co-operating members of the society can 
recognise and act in accordance with these duties and obligations. Therefore it is 
evident that also hierarchical peoples accept Rawls’s set of human rights. 
 
Rawls (1993, 69) also tackles another alleged problem. In non-liberal societies 
citizens are not considered to be individuals who have certain rights and duties. They 
are considered as members of groups: communities, associations, or corporations. 
Keeping this in mind Rawls (ibid, 70) argues that the human rights that he presents 
are not individualistic in a liberal, Western sense, but they can also be protected 
through the consultation hierarchy of the non-liberal society:  
 
“The rights are guaranteed and the requirement that a system of law 
must be such as to impose moral rights and duties is met.”  
 
For Rawls human rights have a special role in international relations. They are distinct 
from domestic rights presented in constitutions or such. Human rights set the limits of 
sovereignty, and they are an important part of a reasonable Law of Peoples. Rawls 
(ibid, 71) presents three functions for human rights: 
 
1. They are a necessary condition of a regime’s legitimacy and of the 
decency of its legal order. 
2. By being in place, they are also sufficient to exclude justified and forceful 
intervention by other peoples, say by economic sanctions, or in grave 
cases, by military force. 
3. They set a limit on pluralism among peoples. 
 
 
The second stage of the Law of Peoples 
The second stage of the theory deals with non-ideal theory. The non-ideal theory is 
about how the ideal theory could be put in practice and how its aims could be attained. 
Policies, practices and principles that are effective and morally permissible are sought. 
Rawls holds that status quo does not affect the ideal theory but it has repercussions on 
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the non-ideal theory. The social evils and great injustices of the contemporary world 
put us in the position to create the non-ideal theory (1993, 71). 
 
The first step of the non-ideal theory is called non-compliance. It refers to certain 
outlawed regimes, as Rawls (ibid, 72) calls them, that do not comply with the law of 
peoples. The outlawed regimes are societies that do not have the concepts of right and 
justice or consider no limits to their authority. 
 
Rawls (1993, 73) suggests that the members of the society of well-ordered peoples 
have a duty to one another and also to the subjects of outlawed regimes to bring all 
peoples to honor the Law of Peoples. However, the first and the most urgent task is to 
defend the society of well-ordered peoples.  
 
Rawls argues that it is not a task of political philosophy to answer how these aims are 
to be reached. It is a matter of politics to find the means – practices and policies – to 
eventually bring all peoples to honor the Law of Peoples. However, Rawls (ibid, 74) 
outlines some means to attain the aims of the non-ideal theory. Well-ordered peoples 
could establish some international forums expressing the public opinion of well-
ordered societies. By pressure, outlaw regimes would change their ways, but that 
would require military and economic pressure. Military aid and the access to mutually 
beneficial co-operative practices should be denied. Rawls (ibid, 73) argues that the 
only legitimate grounds for rightful war against outlaw regimes are the defence of the 
society of well-ordered regimes and the protection of human rights. 
 
The second step of the non-ideal theory is about unfavourable conditions that hinder 
societies from fulfilling the requirements of well-ordered peoples. Rawls (ibid, 75) 
states that these kind of societies lack political and cultural traditions, human capital 
and know-how, as well as material and technological resources. The aim, as in the 
first step of the non-ideal theory, is to bring all societies to honor the Law of Peoples. 
Therefore the societies burdened by unfavourable conditions should be assisted 
toward conditions that make a well-ordered society possible (see ibid, 76). 
 
Rawls (ibid.) emphasises that the way of assisting societies burdened by unfavourable 
conditions is not a liberal one. The difference principle or any other liberal, 
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distributive principle is not the way of solving the problem because there are societies 
that do not comply with the liberal ideas of distributive justice. However, it is not the 
case that wealthier countries do not have the duty to assist poorer societies burdened 
by unfavourable conditions. The principle governing the assistance of poorer societies 
is not based on liberal ideas but on the aim that all peoples should eventually be 
members of the society of well-ordered peoples. 
 
Rawls does not answer the question about how societies burdened by unfavourable 
conditions should be assisted. He (1993, 76-77) argues that the answer varies from 
one country to another. However, Rawls claims that the problem usually is not the 
lack of resources but the lack of cultural and political traditions. The question is about 
the nature of political culture and about religious and philosophical traditions 
undermining the use of resources. Rawls holds that it is likely that the reason is an 
oppressive government and a corrupt elite. As an example Rawls mentions the 
subjection of women that leads to overpopulation that no economy can sustain. 
 
Summary 
Every society must respect human rights that determine the legitimacy of the 
society. 
Every human has the right to life, security, personal property, formal equality and 
to form an association. Everyone is free to emigrate and choose his/her religion. 
These human rights are transcultural. 
Every society is independent and free from political or military intervention 
except in the case of violation of human rights. 
If the society is under a non-legitimate attack it has the right to self-defence. 
The societies who possess no adequate technology, know-how and material 
resources are assisted so that they can respect the Law of Peoples.  
The society can receive help in times of natural disaster but the society is 
responsible for taking care of its territory. 
The Law of Peoples ties together our moral convictions and therefore it is 
universally applicable. 
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3 Empirical study 
 
A questionnaire based on the core ideas of the Law of Peoples was sent to university 
students in 12 countries –Finland, Sweden, Norway, Poland, USA, Germany, Austria, 
France, Morocco, India, Tanzania and Denmark. University students were considered 
to be proper respondents – although the subject studied, sex, nationality, religion and 
age may influence their views on international justice. I must emphasise that the aim 
was not to get a random sample covering all different cultures in the world. The 
purpose was just to examine whether even these informants from 12 countries could 
accept Rawls’s theory, and consequently, whether their considered judgements would 
match Rawls’s principles.  
 
The questionnaire was translated into Finnish, German and French (see appendices 3, 
4 and 5). the Swedish students received a slightly different questionnaire. The 
questionnaire (see appendix 1) was already sent to Sweden when Professor Pertti 
Pelto from University of Connecticut advised to change the questionnaire. As a result, 
the other informants received a slightly different questionnaire (see appendix 2) in 
which proposition 10 was split in two. Therefore it was not possible to compare 
Sweden to other countries statistically. 
 
The questionnaire was constructed on Likert’s scale. The Likert’s scale is based on a 
set of questions measuring the same examined phoneme. In the present case, the scale 
measured to which extent the respondents agreed with Rawls’s principles. There were 
24 propositions in the questionnaire and next to each proposition there was a scale 
from one to five from which the informants circled the choice corresponding to their 
moral judgement.  
 
The data was examined with consensus analysis in order to find out whether the 
principles of international justice and human rights are culturally defined, as 
relativism argues. As Weller & Romney (1988, 73) state the correspondence between 
any two informants is a function of the extent to which each has knowledge of the 
culturally correct answer.3 Informants are considered to give knowledge on questions. 
                                                           
3 See also Romney, Weller and Batchelder 1986. 
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The more correlation there is between the informants the more the questions tell us 
about the culture defining the answers. Weller & Romney (ibid, 76) state that 
 
“The reliability of informants can be calculated from the average inter-
correlation among respondents and the number of respondents. Thus 
reliability of a set of responses is a function of the degree of agreement among 
respondents and the number of respondents. The square root of the reliability 
coefficient estimates the validity of the aggregated responses, that is, it is as 
estimate of the correlation between the “true” or culturally correct answers 
and the empirically obtained answers.” 
 
Logistic regression analysis examines the relationship between a response variable 
and one or more explanatory variables (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989, 8). The analysis 
in the present study was based on dichotomous data. I wanted to see whether different 
response groups accepted or rejected Rawls’s theory and whether the differences 
between response groups were statistically significant. This is what this survey is all 
about – to see whether some culturally defined groups can accept the Law of Peoples. 
Therefore, the data was recoded to zeros and ones. Choices 1 (I strongly agree) and 2 
(I agree) were recoded to ones, and choices 3 (Cannot say), 4 (I disagree) and 5 (I 
strongly disagree) to zeros.  
 
All propositions were dependent variables, and their relationship to nationality, 
gender, the studied subject, religion and age were examined with regression analysis. 
In this case, it was interesting to know, whether there were differences in accepting 
Rawls’s theory between nationalities, sexes, religions and age groups, because 
relativists and realists argue that the culture makes so much difference that it is 
impossible to create any universals. For instance, the analysis would show whether 
American Christian males aged 39-49 were significantly different from other 
informants. 
 
The dependent variable was examined in the light of covariates, i.e. independent 
variables. In each covariate one category was chosen to be a reference group to which 
the other categories were compared. In order to serve the aim of the study, 
classifications “American”, “male”, “Christian”, “age 39-49” were marked as 
reference categories because they referred to Rawls’s characteristics. The arguments 
for setting these particular classifications as reference categories spring from cultural 
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relativism. If our thinking and opinions were connected to the surrounding culture, we 
could suppose that Rawls’s way of thinking was affected by American, Christian male 
culture. Hence, it was reasonable to examine whether other categories significantly 
differ from the ones of Rawls’, and consequently whether Rawls succeeded in getting 
rid of the influence of his own cultural background, that of American culture.  
 
It needs to be mentioned here that Sweden was not included in the logistic regression 
analysis because the questionnaire sent to Swedish students was different from the 
one sent to the others. Swedish students answered to 23 questions and others to 24. 
Hence, it was not possible to perform the logistic analysis with Swedish data because 
there were missing values in the data matrix.  
 
3.1 Findings 
Answers were received from 7 countries – Finland (n=30), Sweden (n=34), Norway 
(n=35), Poland (n=64), USA (n=30), Germany (n=48) and Tanzania (n=29). 
Altogether 270 students answered, of whom 108 informants were men and 160 
women4.  Three categories based on religion were formed – Christians (n=179), 
Muslims (n=10) and atheists (n=36). Other religious groups were also mentioned – 
Armenian Apostolic, Episcopalian, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Methodist, Orthodox, 
Presbyterian – but their number was too small (n=1-2) to include them in the analysis. 
 
Most of the respondents (n=191) were 17 to 27 years old, 65 were 28 to 38 years old 
and 9 were 39 to 49 years old. There were 5 missing values in the age category. The 
informants were also asked to list countries where they had lived for more than 5 
years. The number of other countries was too small to perform any statistical analysis, 
however, we asked in which department the informants studied but again no 
meaningful categories could not be built because too many students did not answer 
the question. In addition, a vast majority of the informants studied social sciences and 
there was correlation between nationality and the studied subject. The correlation 
between nationality and studied subject caused problems in the logistic regression 
analysis, and therefore the categories based on studies were dropped out. 
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Table 1. Endorsement value and Cronbach’s alpha by response groups. * 
Group N Mean Std.Deviation Cronbach’s alpha
Total 270 4.12 0.46 0.8795 
Finland 30 4.2 0.5 0.8845 
Sweden 34 4.07 0.5 0.8852 
Norway 35 4.0 0.58 0.9225 
Poland 64 4.23 0.23 0.577 
USA 30 4.13 0.79 0.9547 
Germany 48 4.17 0.29 0.7003 
Tanzania 29 4.11 0.4 0.7704 
Male 108 4.09 0.47 0.8704 
Female 160 4.15 0.46 0.8774 
Missing values 2 - - - 
Atheists 36 4.06 0.58 0.9032 
Christians 179 4.14 0.45 0.9927 
Muslims 10 3.99 0.32 0.754 
Others 45 - - - 
Age 17-27 191 4.1 0.51 0.8842 
Age 28-38 65 4.19 0.31 0.7438 
Age 39-49 9 4.05 0.28 0.9413 
Missing values 5 - - - 
Smallest value possible  - 1 - - 
Biggest value possible - 5 - - 
Answers of each respondent (1-5) were summed up, after which the mean and standard deviation were 
calculated for each category. 
 
In table 1 we can see the endorsement of Rawls’s theory by response groups. For each 
group the n, mean and standard deviation were calculated. First, the scale was 
reversed. In the original scale one stood for “Yes, I strongly agree” and five for “No, I 
strongly disagree”. However, it was more logical that the acceptance grows when the 
number gets greater. Then the answers of each respondent were summed up and 
divided by 24 (the number of propositions), on which basis the mean and deviation for 
each response group were calculated. The mean was called endorsement value 
because it indicated the degree of acceptance of a certain response group. The range 
of the endorsement value was 1-5, and the bigger the value was the more similar the 
informants’ conceptions of international justice were to Rawls’s principles. The 
endorsement value of the whole sample was 4.12. The biggest endorsement value 
(4.23) was in the case of Poland and the smallest (3.99) in the case of Muslims. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 There were two missing values in this category. 
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Chart 1. Average approval, dichotomous data. 
 
When the average approval was calculated with dichotomous data, it was found out 
that 179 informants of the total of 236 accepted Rawls’s theory. The total number of 
informants was smaller than in table 1 because only the informants who had filled in 
the questionnaire completely (answered all the questions) were included in order not 
to distort the calculations. The average approval was calculated by summing up the 
answers of each informant and then dividing by 24, after which the results were 
recoded. If the result was 4 or more, the informants’ average approval was marked as 
one because the value 4 stood for “I agree”. 
76
23 
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Table 2. Endorsement of Rawls’s propositions by response groups.* 
Rawls’s proposition Total Finland Sweden  Norway Poland USA Germany Tanzania 
1. Peoples should be free and independent. 4.29 3.83 3.18 4.54 4.92 4.47 4.10 4.48 
2. All peoples should be equally free and 
independent. 
4.46 4.20 4.06 4.60 4.77 4.50 4.25 4.62 
3. No people have the right to subjucate other 
people. 
4.23 4.10 3.71 4.09 4.78 4.37 3.92 4.28 
4. Peoples are equal and parties of their own 
agreements. 
4.14 4.37 3.71 4.06 4.50 4.27 3.85 4.03 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defence. 4.20 4.00 3.91 4.00 4.63 4.30 4.19 3.93 
6. Peoples have no right to war. 3.16 3.00 3.76 3.43 3.20 2.93 3.04 2.66 
7. The only legitimate ground for initiating 
warfare is in the case of gross violations of 
human rights. 
3.12 3.07 3.47 2.97 3.06 3.27 3.08 2.97 
8. The only legitimate ground for intervention is 
in the case of gross violations of human rights. 
3.25 3.07 3.56 3.06 3.36 3.30 3.00 3.45 
9. People have no right to make up for 
irresponsibility in caring of their land by 
conquest in war. 
3.16 4.70 - 3.60 3.00 3.37 4.67 2.24 
10. People have no right to make up for 
irresponsibility in caring of their land by 
migrating into other peoples’ territory without 
consent. 
3.07 4.47 - 3.14 2.91 3.37 4.33 2.97 
11. Peoples are to observe treaties and 
undertakings. 
4.23 4.60 3.74 3.71 4.63 4.03 4.33 4.24 
12. Peoples should be responsible for their 
actions. 
4.43 4.40 4.09 4.26 4.70 4.70 4.23 4.55 
13. Peoples are to observe certain restrictions on 
the conduct of war. 
4.01 4.10 3.56 3.74 4.31 3.93 4.10 4.07 
14. Peoples are to honor human rights. 4.64 4.73 4.50 4.43 4.88 4.60 4.77 4.31 
15. Human rights should not depend on any 
particular philosophical doctrine. 
4.02 4.23 3.59 4.34 4.09 3.73 4.33 3.52 
16. Everyone should have the right to life and 
security. 
4.75 4.80 4.76 4.54 4.92 4.73 4.65 4.72 
17. Everyone should have the right to personal 
property. 
4.49 4.37 4.59 3.83 4.86 4.50 4.46 4.55 
18. Everyone should have the right of 
association. 
4.19 4.10 4.68 4.14 3.75 4.17 4.33 4.52 
19. Everyone should have the right to emigration. 4.10 4.30 4.56 3.63 3.86 3.80 4.54 4.00 
20. Everyone should have the right to formal 
equality. 
4.58 4.63 4.59 4.43 4.84 4.43 4.54 4.34 
21. Everyone should have the right to liberty of 
conscience and to religion. 
4.53 4.80 4.50 4.26 4.73 4.47 4.46 4.31 
22. Peoples have no right to violate the human 
rights of certain minority (e.g. religious or ethnic) 
within their borders. 
4.51 4.40 4.59 4.54 4.66 4.53 4.42 4.28 
23. Peoples should make every effort within their 
means to give aid to peoples in response to 
natural disasters such as famine, flood, draught, 
cyclones etc. 
4.48 4.47 4.03 4.49 4.77 4.20 4.60 4.48 
24. Each society burdened by the unfavouralble 
conditions (e.g. lack of technological know-how, 
political traditions, natural resources) should be 
assisted towards conditions that makes the 
observance of international law and human rights 
possible. 
4.05 4.17 4.38 4.06 4.11 3.67 3.88 4.07 
Mean 4.09 4.2 4.07 4 4.26 4.07 4.17 3.98 
Std.Deviation 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.69 0.52 0.49 0.67 
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Table 3. Endorsement of Rawls’s propositions by religion, age and sex.* 
Rawls’s proposition Atheists Christians Muslim Age 17-
27 
Age 28-
38 
Age 39-
49 
Male Female 
1. Peoples should be free and independent. 4.22 4.44 4.70 4.37 4.11 3.89 4.27 4.29 
2. All peoples should be equally free and 
independent. 
4.47 4.47 4.80 4.45 4.51 4.33 4.38 4.50 
3. No people have the right to subjucate other 
people. 
4.00 4.36 3.80 4.20 4.28 4.33 4.17 4.26 
4. Peoples are equal and parties of their own 
agreements. 
3.94 4.22 4.10 4.15 4.09 4.00 4.10 4.15 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defence. 4.06 4.27 4.00 4.18 4.20 4.33 4.37 4.07 
6. Peoples have no right to war. 3.33 3.08 2.60 3.12 3.37 2.78 2.88 3.37 
7. The only legitimate ground for initiating 
warfare is in the case of gross violations of 
human rights. 
3.00 3.09 2.70 3.04 3.34 3.22 3.01 3.21 
8. The only legitimate ground for intervention is 
in the case of gross violations of human rights. 
3.06 3.20 3.10 3.21 3.29 3.56 3.16 3.32 
9. People have no right to make up for 
irresponsibility in caring of their land by 
conquest in war. 
3.86 3.58 2.80 3.24 2.95 2.56 3.57 2.86 
10. People have no right to make up for 
irresponsibility in caring of their land by 
migrating into other peoples’ territory without 
consent. 
3.44 3.54 3.10 3.12 2.92 2.67 3.61 2.69 
11. Peoples are to observe treaties and 
undertakings. 
4.03 4.35 3.80 4.17 4.35 4.44 4.24 4.22 
12. Peoples should be responsible for their 
actions. 
4.14 4.52 4.60 4.42 4.42 4.78 4.42 4.44 
13. Peoples are to observe certain restrictions on 
the conduct of war. 
3.94 4.09 3.80 4.00 4.06 3.89 4.02 4.00 
14. Peoples are to honor human rights. 4.67 4.72 4.00 4.65 4.65 4.67 4.59 4.68 
15. Human rights should not depend on any 
particular philosophical doctrine. 
4.36 4.08 3.10 3.94 4.23 4.00 3.94 4.07 
16. Everyone should have the right to life and 
security. 
4.50 4.77 4.90 4.75 4.75 4.78 4.64 4.82 
17. Everyone should have the right to personal 
property. 
4.19 4.51 4.60 4.49 4.49 4.56 4.44 4.52 
18. Everyone should have the right of 
association. 
4.11 4.08 4.40 4.12 4.35 4.44 4.15 4.21 
19. Everyone should have the right to emigration. 4.06 4.04 3.90 4.03 4.31 3.89 4.14 4.06 
20. Everyone should have the right to formal 
equality. 
4.50 4.58 4.50 4.53 4.71 4.78 4.50 4.63 
21. Everyone should have the right to liberty of 
conscience and to religion. 
4.25 4.58 4.50 4.50 4.60 4.67 4.46 4.58 
22. Peoples have no right to violate the human 
rights of certain minority (e.g. religious or ethnic) 
within their borders. 
4.56 4.45 4.90 4.54 4.45 4.44 4.37 4.60 
23. Peoples should make every effort within their 
means to give aid to peoples in response to 
natural disasters such as famine, flood, draught, 
cyclones etc. 
4.61 4.51 4.80 4.48 4.55 4.22 4.49 4.47 
24. Each society burdened by the unfavorable 
conditions (e.g. lack of technological know-how, 
political traditions, natural resources) should be 
assisted towards conditions that makes the 
observance of international law and human rights 
possible. 
4.08 3.94 4.20 4.04 4.09 4.00 3.92 4.13 
Mean 4.06 4.14 3.99 4.07 4.13 4.05 4.08 4.09 
Std.Deviation 0.46 0.5 0.4 0.53 0.54 0.66 0.49 0.58 
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Tables 2 and 3 show the endorsement of each Rawls’s proposition by response 
groups. In every category the informants’ answers to each question were summed up 
and then divided by the number of respondents in the group, on which basis the mean 
and standard deviation were calculated. The range was 1 to 5 according to the 
recoding. If the value was 4 to 5, the response group could endorse Rawls proposition 
because 4 referred to “Yes, I agree”. If the value was near to 3, the response group 
could not answer (choice number 3 referred to “cannot say”). Finally, if the value was 
1 to 2, the conception of international justice of the response group did not match with 
the one of Rawls. 
 
In the Finnish data the endorsement value varied from 3.00 to 4.80. The proposition 
“Peoples have no right to war” had the smallest endorsement value and the 
propositions “Everyone should have the right to life and security” and “Everyone 
should have the right to liberty of conscience and to religion” had the highest 
endorsement value. The smallest endorsement value (3.18) of the Swedish data was 
for the proposition “Peoples should be free and equal”. The proposition “Everyone 
should have the right to life and security” got the highest value in Sweden (4.76), as 
well as in Poland (4.92), USA (4.73) and Tanzania (4.72).  
 
When informants were categorised by religion, age and sex it was found out that the 
proposition “Everyone should have the right to life and security” got the highest 
values from the Christians (4.77), Muslims (4.9), the age group 17-27 (4.75), the age 
group 28-38 (4.75), the age group 39-49 (4.78), males (4.64) and females (4.82). In 
the case of atheists, the proposition “Peoples are to honor human rights” was marked 
with the biggest endorsement value, that of 4.67. 
 
It must be noticed that in some cases the proposition about having the right to life and 
security was not the only one to get the biggest endorsement value. In the case of 
Poland, the endorsement value of the proposition “Peoples should be free and 
independent” also was 4.92. In the Muslims’ data the proposition “Peoples have no 
right to violate the human rights of certain minority within their borders” also had a 
high endorsement value (4.90). The propositions “Everyone should have the right to 
formal equality” and “Peoples should be responsible of their actions” were also 
marked with high endorsement values (4.78) by the informants aged 39 to 49. 
  43
 
In the Norwegian data the proposition “All peoples should be equally free and 
independent” was marked with the highest endorsement value (4.6). The smallest 
endorsement values in the case of Norway (2.97), atheists (3.00) and the age group 
17-27 (3.04) were for the proposition “The only legitimate ground for initiating 
warfare is the case of gross violations of human rights”.  
 
The proposition “Peoples have no right to war” had the smallest values in four 
categories – Finland (3.00), USA (2.93), Muslims (2.60), male (2.88) and Christians 
(3.08). In the German data the smallest endorsement value (3.00) appeared in the 
proposition “The only legitimate ground for intervention is in the case of gross 
violations of human rights”. The smallest endorsement value of the Tanzanian data 
(2.4) and that of the age category 39-49 (2.56) were in the case of the proposition 
“People have no right to make up for irresponsibility in caring of their land by 
conquest in war”. The smallest endorsement values in the case of Poland (2.91), 
female informants (2.69) and informants aged 28 to 38 (2.92) were marked for the 
proposition “People have no right to make up for irresponsibility in caring of their 
land by migrating into other peoples’ territory without consent”. 
 
Table 4. Consensus coefficients by response groups. 
Response group Consensus Value Response Group Consensus Value 
The whole data 0.9938 Female 0.9889 
USA 0.9621 Male 0.9827 
Tanzania 0.9693 Atheist 0.9473 
Sweden 0.9762 Christians 0.9507 
Poland 0.9920 Muslim 0.8938 
Norway 0.9468 Age 17-27 0.9920 
Germany 0.9741 Age 28-38 0.9660 
Finland 0.9557 Age 39-49 0.8157 
 
Only in two cases the consensus coefficient was smaller than 0.9 – Muslims (0.8938) 
and the age group 39-49 (0.8157) (see Table 4 above). The biggest consensus 
coefficient (0.9938) appeared in the case of the whole data. In the rest of the cases, 
except for Norway and the atheists, the coefficient was greater than 0.95.  
Variable Average approval No right to make up irresponsibility by 
conquest (Q9) 
No right to make up irresponsibility by 
migrating (Q10) 
 B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig 
Nationality 
(American) 
      
  Finnish 1.1763 
(0.7013) 
0.0935 3.5396* 
(0.9481) 
0.0002 2.8305* 
(0.8165) 
0.0005 
  Norwegian 0.3650 
(0.6678) 
0.5846 0.8402 
(0.6824) 
0.2182 0.1568 
(0.6802) 
0.8177 
  German 0.3885 
(0.6342) 
0.5402 3.7356* 
(0.9305) 
0.0001 2.5897* 
(0.7625) 
0.0007 
  Polish 1.4189* 
(0.6158) 
0.0212 -0.5336 
(0.5604) 
0.3410 -0.3745 
(0.5569) 
0.5013 
  Tanzanian 0.5471 
(0.7195) 
0.4471 -1.1723 
(0.8341) 
0.1599 -0.5090 
(0.7099) 
0.4734 
Age category (39-
49) 
      
  Age 28-38 0.7852 
(0.9936) 
0.4294 1.2751 
(1.1997) 
0.2879 0.6280 
(0.9652) 
0.5153 
  Age 17-27 0.2134 
(0.9062) 
0.8138 1.4440 
(1.1233) 
0.1986 0.6416 
(0.9052) 
0.4785 
Sex (male)       
  Female 0.4179 
(0.3757) 
0.2660 -0.0388 
(0.4147) 
0.9255 -1.1138* 
(0.3803) 
0.0034 
Religion (Christian)       
  Muslim -1.7987 
(0.9886) 
0.0688 0.4084 
(1.2762) 
0.7489 0.6199 
(1.0531) 
0.5561 
  Atheist -0.1952 
(-0.1952) 
0.6935 -0.4591 
(0.5857) 
0.4330 -0.9039 
(0.5648) 
0.1095 
Constant 0.5142 
(0.4595) 
0.2631 -0.0318 
(0.5589) 
0.9546 0.3037 
(0.4750) 
0.5227 
-2 Log Likelihood 217.355  187.155  212.081  
Nagelkerke R^2 0.120  0.520  0.412  
 Significant at p-value 0.05 
Table 5. Logistic regression analysis. 
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  
Variable Peoples are to honor human 
rights (Q14) 
Human rights are independent 
from any philosophical doctrine 
(Q15) 
Everyone has the right to 
emigration (Q19) 
Agree on provisions for mutual 
aid (Q23) 
Assistance in the case of 
unfavourable conditions (Q24) 
 B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig 
Nationality 
(American) 
          
  Finnish -0.1960 
(1.3247) 
0.8824 0.9240 
(0.6837) 
0.1765 1.1909 
(0.6715) 
0.0762 1.3832 
(0.9771) 
0.1569 1.1721 
(0.6818) 
0.0856 
  Norwegian -0.9184 
(1.3155) 
0.4851 1.3197 
(0.7809) 
0.0911 0.2866 
(0.6729) 
0.6701 0.6558 
(0.9717) 
0.4997 0.3095 
(0.6612) 
0.6397 
  German 1.2124 
(1.5898) 
0.4457 1.2363 
(0.6845) 
0.0709 2.2181* 
(0.7963) 
0.0053 9.2771 
(37.8475) 
0.8064 0.5919 
(0.6215) 
0.3408 
  Polish 1.0860 
(1.4682) 
0.4595 0.4943 
(0.5589) 
0.3765 0.5176 
(0.5327) 
0.3313 1.8735* 
(0.9066) 
0.0388 1.2874* 
(0.5752) 
0.0252 
  Tanzanian -0.4126 
(1.3200) 
0.7546 -0.2215 
(0.6923) 
0.7490 1.1183 
(0.7442) 
0.1329 0.3426 
(0.9459) 
0.7172 0.5703 
(0.7031) 
0.4173 
Age (39-49)           
  Age 28-38 1.4902 
(1.6222) 
0.3583 0.7159 
(1.0097) 
0.4783 1.8918* 
(0.9339) 
0.0428 9.5923 
(35.7992) 
0.7887 0.0471 
(0.9613) 
0.9609 
  Age 17-27 0.1817 
(1.2329) 
0.8828 -0.0293 
(0.9300) 
0.9749 1.4069 
(0.8426) 
0.0950 1.3118 
(0.9950) 
0.1874 0.3554 
(0.9068) 
0.6951 
Sex (male)           
  Female 1.2327 
(0.7646) 
0.1069 0.7867* 
(0.3811) 
0.0390 -0.0062 
(0.3765) 
0.9869 0.2189 
(0.6748) 
0.7456 -0.0426 
(0.3644) 
0.9069 
Religion 
(Christian) 
          
  Muslim -2.2821* 
(1.1595) 
0.0490 -0.5548 
(0.9276) 
0.5497 -1.5589 
(0.9768) 
0.1105 9.0776 
(104.0152) 
0.9305 -0.2037 
(0.9730) 
0.8342 
  Atheist 1.0927 
(1.1965) 
0.3611 0.4676 
(0.6290) 
0.4572 0.6303 
(0.5926) 
0.2875 1.1380 
(1.2111) 
0.3474 0.5061 
(0.5288) 
0.3386 
Constant 2.8049 
(0.7506) 
0.0002 1.1350* 
(0.4693) 
0.0156 0.4563 
(0.4512) 
0.3118 9.1292 
(37.2074) 
0.8062 0.9180 
(0.4567) 
0.0444 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
76.293  215.379  215.175  83.992  228.786  
Nagelkerke R^2 0.203  0.146  0.160  0.269  0.059  
*Significant at p-value 0.05. 
N.B. This table only includes the cases where significant differences appeared. See appendix for all the cases. 
Regression analysis was run for each proposition and also for the average approval 
(see Table 5 above). The average approval indicated whether the informant accepted 
Rawls’s theory. According to the null-hypothesis of the analysis there are no 
differences in any explanatory variable. We must remember that the cases were 
compared to Rawls’s characteristics. That is to say that if any significant cases are 
found they are significantly different from American, Christian, male, person aged 39 
to 49. 
 
In Table 5 the value B refers to the estimate of change in the dependent variable that 
can be attributed to a change of one unit in the independent variable. For instance, one 
significant difference was found when the logistic regression analysis was performed 
for the average approval. The B value of the Polish informants was 1.4789 with the 
significance of 0.0212. In other words, there is only a chance of 2.1% that the null-
hypothesis stands. The analysis was done in comparison to American informants. 
 
Proposition 9 “People have no right to make up for irresponsibility in caring of their 
land by conquest in war” also carried significant differences. The B-value of the 
Finnish informants was 3.5396 and that of the German informants 3.7356. The 
significance of the Germans’ B-value was 0.0001 and that of the Finnish data 0.0002. 
Age, sex or religion had no significance as explanatory variables. The Finnish and 
German informants were significantly different from the American ones. 
 
The variables “sex” and “nationality” were significant in the case of proposition 10 
“People have no right to make up for irresponsibility in caring of their land by 
migrating into other peoples’ territory without consent”. The female respondents’ B-
value was –1.1138 and its significance was 0.0034, i.e. the female informants were 
significantly different from the male informants as regards to this proposition. The 
significance of the Finnish students’ B-value (2.8305) was 0.0005 and that of the 
Germans informants 0.0007. The B-value of German students was 2.5897. Once 
again, the Finnish and German informants were significantly different from the 
American ones. 
 
The Muslims differed from the Christians regarding the proposition “People are to 
honor human rights” (number 14). The B-value of Muslims was –2.2821 and its 
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significance 0.0490. The female informants had a B-value of 0.7867 in the case of the 
proposition “Human rights should not depend on any particular philosophical 
doctrine” (number 15). The significance was 0.0390. In other words, there is only 
possibility of 3.9% that there are no differences between male and female informants.  
 
The B-value of the Germans was significantly different from the American ones 
regarding the proposition “Everyone should have the right to emigration” (number 
19). The B-value of the German group was 2.2181 and its significance was 0.0053. 
The B-value of the age category 28-38 was 1.8918 and the significance 0.0428. In 
other words, these informants were significantly different from the ones aged 39-49.  
 
The answers to the proposition “Peoples should make every effort within their means 
to give aid to peoples in response to natural disasters such as famine, flood, draught, 
cyclones etc” (number 23) were significantly different in terms of nationality. The B-
value of the Polish informants was 1.8735. The significance was 0.0388.  
 
There was another case where Polish informants were significantly different from 
their American counterparts: the Polish informants had the B-value of 1.2874 in the 
case of proposition 24. According to this proposition “Each society burdened by the 
unfavourable conditions (e.g. lack of technological know-how, political traditions, 
natural resources) should be assisted towards conditions that makes the observance of 
international law and human rights possible”. The significance was 0.0252. The other 
variables (sex, religion, age) did not carry any importance.  
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4 Discussion 
In the following chapters criticism against Law of Peoples is discussed. The 
discussion is divided into 3 parts. It begins issues of argumentation and then continues 
towards questions related to empiria. First, it is examined whether Law of Peoples is 
coherent, sound and flawless, after which the conditions of reality are considered.  
 
 
4.1. The definition of actors and the conditions of agreement 
 
 
Why are there no individuals in the original position instead of representatives of 
societies? 
In Justice As Fairness and in Law of Peoples Rawls used the same method, but in the 
first one he started with individuals in the original position. Now the question rises, 
why did the Law of Peoples begin with the original position where the representatives 
of peoples are present? Why did Rawls not start with individuals who could construct 
a world state guided by principles of justice? 
 
Hoffman (1995, 54) renders another version of Rawls’s theory starting with 
individuals. He claims that the result is not any better. Actually, we must doubt 
whether we can even construct such a theory because there are too many questions to 
be solved. For instance, it must be asked whether the parties in the original position 
know about the existence of states? If they do, how should they divide the land? On 
what basis should the borders be defined and should nationality matter? Finally, 
should there be any borders at all? Hoffman argues that the outcome would not be any 
better and he suggests that any principles should be formed on the basis of real world 
experiences. But what are those real world experiences that Hoffman refers to? 
 
We must keep in mind that Rawls meant the Law of Peoples to apply to reality, i.e. to 
international law and principles governing the affairs between states. His aim was not 
to construct a new international system but to base his theory on the existing state 
system. Thus, it would not be relevant to begin in the original position where all 
humans were present. At the societal level, individuals are relatively important and 
powerful actors, but the state is the principal actor at the international arena in spite of 
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emerging new actors, such as multinational corporations (MNCs). It is rare for 
humans to interact at the international level in order to pursuit their individual 
interests. They merely represent states and other actors of international politics. 
 
Actually, Rawls believes that a world state would lead to despotism and that there 
would always be some religious groups seeking for a state of their own. It is a fact 
that states exist and that they are the principal actors in international relations. The 
international system is both based on and constructed by the states as individuals 
construct the society. As Rawls (1993, 50) himself emphasises, peoples as corporate 
bodies organised by their governments exist all over the world in some form.  
 
Justice As Fairness dealt with the justice within a society, and Law of Peoples is about 
the justice between them. Rawls uses a constructivist doctrine that has been modified 
to fit in each subject in question, and states are the relevant subjects of Law of 
Peoples. Law of Peoples continues where Justice As Fairness ended. Moreover, the 
theory would nullify Justice As Fairness if it started with individuals. There would be 
no need for Justice As Fairness and that could not have been Rawls’s aim because 
Rawls states that Justice As Fairness is an apt starting point for Law of Peoples.  
 
 
Why is it ambiguous to speak of peoples instead of states? 
We have now concluded that peoples are the relevant actors in international politics 
and therefore the Law of Peoples sets the rules for them. But what is a people? 
According to Hoffman (1995, 53) Rawls does not define “people” well enough. Even 
though peoples exist, it does not follow that the same definition of a people is 
accepted everywhere. As examples Hoffman gives the Soviet Union, Rwanda and 
Algeria that all have had some sort of problems with the definition of a people.  
 
At first it might be difficult to say what Rawls means by “people”. McAlester (1993, 
94) explains the difference between “a people”, “people” and “peoples” as follows: 
 
  Singular   Plural 
  a person  people 
  a people  peoples 
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People in plural means a group of individual persons. Rawls often uses wording “a 
people” and “peoples”. According to Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 
of English Language (1996) the word “people” means the whole body of persons 
constituting a community, tribe, race, or nation because of a common culture, history, 
religion, or the like. However, does Rawls mean a nation that can be constituted of 
different kind of peoples? For instance, in Finland there are many peoples - Lapps, 
Swedish, Finnish and Gypsies, but together they constitute the Finnish people. Does 
the Law of People grant rights to nation states or also to peoples within nation states? 
If all peoples, also the ones within national borders have the rights defined by Rawls, 
the whole world will change. The Lapps could claim independence, also the 
Quebecois, Basques, Catalans etc. The present states would collapse.  
 
We need to notice that Rawls also refers to societies – liberal and hierarchical ones. 
Moreover, Rawls refers to democratic societies. All this implies that Rawls means 
nation states. Rawls starts with the liberal societies that are organised with a liberal 
conception of justice such as Justice As Fairness. In Justice As Fairness Rawls 
introduces the concept of justice of societal level. The Law of Peoples constructs a 
concept of international justice that could apply to international law and practices, i.e. 
to how societies should organise their relations. At the international arena states 
representing societies are the principal actors and usually peoples such as the Lapps 
have not much power. If the theory were to apply to reality, it would be more 
reasonable to talk about states that represent societies, which is supposedly what 
Rawls means by “peoples”. For instance, the Lapps cannot sign any international 
agreements, and Rawls speaks of societies that can make international agreements. 
This also implies that Rawls refers to nation states when talking about “peoples”. 
 
However, why did Rawls not use states or nation states in the first place? Why does 
he leave the reader alone with such a niggling question? Would it be more reader-
friendly to speak of states instead of “peoples” and “societies”? If there was a 
particular reason for Rawls to use “people” and “societies” instead of “nation states”, 
he never explains it. Rawls’s concept of people is ambiguous. 
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Hoffman also argues that the concept of a people is not accepted everywhere. But is 
this the case? If a people equals to a state, then Hoffman is wrong. The conflicts to 
which Hoffman refers are a proof for, not against, Rawls’s theory. Even though there 
are conflicts in Rwanda and Algeria, it does not mean that the parties of the conflict 
do not accept the concept of the state. The conflicts are about a new state’s 
independence, not about the concept of the state. 
 
 
Are there really hierarchical societies as described by Rawls? 
The Law of Peoples sets principles for societies, commonly understood as states. But 
Hoffman (1995, 54) argues that there are no such hierarchical societies as Rawls 
describes. Moreover, how can we be sure that the system of law of a hierarchical 
society is legitimate in the eyes of its own people if no free and general elections have 
been held? If the members of a hierarchical society cannot directly express their 
opinions through free elections, how does the system of law meet the requirements 
presented by Rawls? What Hoffman wants to say is that there is not a single regime 
that fits the description of a hierarchical society. 
 
Rawls presents some conditions that a hierarchical society must meet. Hierarchical 
societies must be peaceful and non-expansionist and their system of law must be 
based on the common good conception of justice, in which the fundamental interests 
of all are taken into account. It is required that the hierarchical society respects the 
human rights introduced by Rawls. If it is the case that most of the hierarchical 
societies do not meet these conditions, the Law of Peoples suffers from a flaw. 
However, Hoffman does not give any examples. He cannot prove that most of the 
hierarchical regimes are not peaceful, non-expansionist, their system of law does not 
consider all the members of the society and that they do not respect human rights 
presented in the Law of Peoples. Hoffman’s argument lacks the evidence.  
 
Many states, also non-liberal ones, have signed the conventions on human rights (see 
Ihmisoikeusliitto RY 1995), and those conventions include far more human rights 
than the Law of Peoples. Therefore, is it the case that all non-liberal societies cannot 
comply with the conventions on human rights? In addition, the findings of our 
empirical survey do not support Hoffman’s argument. It seems that a non-liberal 
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society could accept human rights and some of the principles of international justice 
presented in the Law of Peoples. Unfortunately, the sample of the present study 
included only one non-liberal society, which weakens the reliability of the findings. 
 
Moreover, do free and general elections guarantee that all voices are heard? For 
instance in the presidential elections held in the USA in 2000 the candidate that 
actually got more votes did not win. Rawls would argue that not all societies agree on 
free elections because they express Western values, not those of non-liberal societies. 
Moreover, he argues that different voices can be heard through the consultation 
hierarchy, through different kinds of associates and corporate bodies. In Western 
societies individuals seek their interests through different trade organisations, which is 
pretty much the same as what Rawls means by consultation hierarchy. If it works in 
Western societies, why could it not work in non-liberal ones? 
 
 
Would the outcome of the original position be the same with the Scanlonian model? 
We now have the definition of the actors, the representatives of liberal and 
hierarchical societies that decide the principles of international justice behind the veil 
of ignorance. Because of the veil of ignorance the representatives do not know all 
characteristics of their societies. The question rises, is the veil of ignorance too 
effective? According to Barry (1995, 58) this is the case. The representatives do not 
know the terrain type or how much they have natural resources, capital or know-how. 
Hence Barry concludes that the parties in the original position are clones who do not 
have any chance for bargaining because they do not know enough about reality.  
 
The parties try to seek their interests in a rational way. According to Barry the actors 
in the original position cannot pursuit their self-interested aims because they are not 
aware of them. The whole idea of an outcome protecting the vital interests of all is 
jeopardised. It is rational to take some risks but in the situation presented by Rawls it 
is not possible. 
 
As an alternative Barry gives the Scanlonian original position of Thomas M. Scanlon. 
The Scanlonian original position differs from the Rawlsian one by two crucial points: 
1) the parties are aware of their identities and consequently of their own interests, 2) 
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the parties are not motivated simply by the wish to advance their own interests. The 
actors in the Scanlonian original position want to achieve a reasonable agreement. 
The outcome would consist of principles that are in accordance with the aims of all 
parties, and therefore no one has a reason to reject it. This unforced agreement would 
be a fair basis for the original position, and hence there would be no attempt to coerce 
one another. As Barry (ibid, 68) states: 
 
“The only relevant pressure for agreement comes from the desire to find 
and agree on principles which no one who had this desire could 
reasonable reject.” 
 
No one should accept a rule requiring a unilateral sacrifice of his or her interest. 
Hence, Barry argues that the Scanlonian approach achieves the theory’s objectives 
better than the Rawlsian one.  
 
However, does the Scanlonian model differ significantly from that of Rawls? In short, 
it seems that the parties in the Scanlonian original position know their aims and 
characteristics and that the agreement must work for everyone’s interests. The actors 
must reach a consensus because agreement is not possible if even the interests of one 
actor are not respected. 
 
However, the outcome of the Scanlonian model would not be so different from the 
one of Rawls’s model because the known self-interested aims and the consensus as an 
aim cancel each other out. The actors do not have much room for bargaining or for 
seeking their interests because unforced consensus is the aim. In the Rawlsian model 
the parties seek their own self-interested aims but they do not know their 
characteristics. Thus they seek a consensus that would be beneficial for all, as in the 
Scanlonian model. This insures them against the worst possible situation, and in the 
Scanlonian model the parties must agree with the person in the worst situation 
because no one can be forced. The conditions differ but both models lead to the same 
consensus.  
 
 
  54
Are hierarchical societies subordinated? 
We have already answered why we cannot start with the individuals but with peoples 
in the original position, but why does Rawls begin with liberal societies and then 
extend the Law of Peoples to hierarchical ones? Why does he not start with the 
situation where all societies are present? Rawls (1993, 50) starts with democratic 
societies because they have the same kind of historical and social conditions and they 
all have similar reasons for affirming their mode of government. Rawls (ibid, 46-47) 
tries one particular sequence and he argues that the outcome is still consistent and fair: 
 
“…that there are also other forms of unity than that defined by 
completely general first principle forming a consistent scheme. Unity 
may also be given by an appropriate sequence of cases and by 
supposing that the parties in the original position are to proceed 
through the sequence with the understanding that the principles for the 
subject of each later agreement are to be subordinated to those of 
subjects of all earlier agreements, or else co-ordinated with and 
adjusted to them by certain priority rules.” 
 
If the whole theory is based on a liberal starting point, how can it be possible that the 
outcome is neutral? However, the point is that Rawls (ibid 1993, 80) asks what 
hierarchical societies can be reasonably accepted. Rawls merely argues that liberal 
and non-liberal societies could accept the same principles in spite of the particular 
sequence, because there are some basic needs that all societies want to be secured. 
 
On the other hand, if “the principles for the subject of each later agreement are to be 
subordinated to those of the subjects of all earlier agreements" how can it be possible 
that hierarchical societies are not enforced? Liberal societies first agree on the 
principles, after which it is asked what principles hierarchical societies could accept, 
but the hierarchical societies are subordinated to all earlier agreements. How can 
hierarchical societies choose the principles that are harmonious with their cultural 
values? The principles of earlier agreement, the one between liberal societies, may 
conflict with their cultural values. 
 
Even though there are some interests that all societies want to secure, it is not possible 
that non-liberal societies could consent to being forced. This cannot be a fair 
procedure. It would be more reasonable that liberal and non-liberal societies together 
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formed the principles of international justice because all societies could propose and 
bargain on the principles. We need dialogue, not coercion. 
 
We must question the consistency of the Law of Peoples if it was meant to be 
philosophically neutral. It is not a flaw to divide the original position in two but it is a 
mistake to demand that later agreements be subordinated to earlier agreements. Of 
course we can emphasise the last lines of the above quotation: “or else co-ordinated 
with and adjusted to them by certain priority rules”. However, Rawls never explains 
these rules and the two types of society are not equal and do not have the same 
possibilities in forming the principles of international justice. 
 
 
4.2. Arguments for the presented principles 
 
Is it inconsistent not to call for equality and the egalitarian principle of distribution? 
The principles of international justice are examined next. According to Räikkä (1996, 
68) the Law of Peoples can be criticised for being unjust because it allows inequalities 
among societies. The parties in the original position do not endorse the egalitarian 
principle of distribution. Some regimes would possess more material goods and 
resources than others. The parties are rational and they choose the principles for 
appropriate reasons. Why would they not agree upon an egalitarian distribution of 
material well-being between societies? Would it not be more prudent that all peoples 
have the same opportunities in terms of material well-being?  
 
According to Rawls (1993, 75) this is a flaw based on liberal thinking. There are 
societies that do not accept the egalitarian principle that all human beings are equal. In 
some societies individuals or members of a society are not considered equal in rights 
and resources, and therefore the egalitarian principle of distribution of goods would 
not be endorsed.  
 
However, there is an inconsistency in Rawls’s chain of reasoning. He argues that 
societies do not choose the egalitarian principle because it is a liberal idea, but parties 
do agree on being equal in the original position. Rawls (ibid, 65) argues that this is not 
inconsistent: 
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“A people sincerely affirming a non-liberal conception of justice may 
still think their society should be treated equally in a just law of peoples, 
even though its members accept basic inequalities among themselves. 
Though a society lacks basic equality, it is not unreasonable for that 
society to insist on equality in making claims against other peoples.” 
 
It is necessary that peoples are considered equal, because only that will guarantee that 
the societies can be as they are, i.e. some basic inequalities can exist within non-
liberal societies. If peoples were not equal, liberal societies could force hierarchical 
societies to endorse egalitarian principles. Now, all societies are free and have the 
same rights to practice their own cultural traditions within their borders in conjunction 
with the Law of Peoples.  
 
It is not clear, however, why the parties would not accept the egalitarian principle of 
distributive justice. If the parties in the original position, and also afterwards, have the 
same rights to practice their cultural traditions, why should they not also endorse the 
egalitarian principle of distributive justice? If all material well-being were distributed 
equally among societies, they would have even better possibilities to practice their 
cultural traditions, and still hierarchical peoples could allow some basic inequalities 
within their societies.  
 
We must also consider how the parties in the original position would act under a great 
uncertainty. The prudent parties secure themselves against the worst possible situation 
because they can face that situation after the original position. The parties are rational, 
however, and therefore they consider inequalities between and within their societies 
as incentives for better performance. If material well-being were distributed equally 
the citizens of richer countries would stop working and argue: “It does not make any 
sense to work hard and let the profit of my work to be distributed equally. I will work 
no longer if I cannot enjoy the profit of my own work!”. Consequently, there would 
be no advances in technology because the citizens would not be motivated, but the 
good performance and advanced technology encouraged by inequalities would 
eventually spread to poorer countries in terms of help in times of famine and draught. 
As a result, the egalitarian principle of distribution is not adopted. 
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Why does Rawls not explain and give answers to all questions about international 
relations? 
Hoffman (1995, 53) criticises Rawls’s principles of international justice: 
 
“They offer too abstract and conservative code of behavior, especially 
in the world in which interdependence empties the sovereignty of much 
of its substance.” 
 
Rawls is too optimistic in supposing that societies would agree on provisions in times 
of famine and draught and that the provisions would guarantee that all the basic needs 
of the members of these societies were met. Hoffman continues that Rawls does not 
explain how these provisions should be worked out in the real life, which is important 
because there is no supranational actor to define the rules. Rawls meant the Law of 
Peoples to apply to international law and practices, but it is difficult to apply any rules 
to the practice without instructions on how to do it. 
 
On the other hand, it is a huge task to define all details. Concerning the non-ideal 
theory, that of unfavourable conditions and of non-compliance, Rawls (1993, 72) 
holds that status quo – specific conditions of any specific period of time – affect the 
answers to the questions of non-ideal theory. Therefore, it is impossible to give 
specific rules for all issues. In addition, Rawls (ibid, 73) argues that it is not a task of 
political philosophy to answer how all peoples could be brought to honor human 
rights.  
 
“How to do it is a question of foreign policy; these things call for 
political wisdom, and success depends in part on luck.” 
 
Rawls holds that well-ordered peoples establish some sort of intergovernmental 
organisations in order to attain these long-run aims, but he does not give any 
examples of how the mutual aid between peoples and organisations should be 
organised. He (ibid, 76-77) only argues that… 
 
“I shall not attempt to discuss here how this might be done, as the problem of 
giving economical and technological aid so that it makes a sustained 
contribution is highly complicated and varies from country to country.” 
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It is true that Rawls leaves open the question about how to bring all peoples to honor 
human rights. He simply states that peoples shall do the rest after the original position. 
Rawls only presents the basis of international relations. He sets the principles and the 
human rights that set the limits for societies with respect to their rights. A 
supranational actor is not needed to specify rules on intergovernmental organisations 
and mutual help. Societies will organise their relations to one another by conventions 
and agreements, as they have done so far. For instance, within the United Nations 
several programs for societies burdened by unfavourable conditions have been 
established. 
 
Well-ordered societies can agree on more rules if they want. It is only required that 
those rules are in accordance with the principles and human rights introduced by 
Rawls. Rawls puts up the trunk and peoples shall decorate the rest of the tree with 
branches and twigs as they wish according to their customs.  
 
 
The justification and neutrality of human rights 
As we have seen, Rawls’s principles have been criticised for being incomplete, 
ambiguous and inconsistent. Also Rawls’s justification for and arguments for human 
rights are questioned. Let us consider the following quotation. 
 
“…these rights [human rights] do not depend on any particular 
comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophical conception of human nature, 
such as, for example, that human beings are moral persons and have equal 
worth, or that they can have certain particular moral and intellectual powers 
that entitle them to these rights. This would require quite a deep philosophical 
theory that many if not most hierarchical societies would reject as liberal or 
democratic, or in some way distinctive of the Western political tradition and 
prejudicial to other cultures.” 
    (Rawls 1993, 68) 
 
According to Charney (1999, 846) Rawls is wrong to suppose (1) that not all cultures 
consider humans to have equal worth and (2) that it is very difficult, if impossible to 
construct a theory according to which humans are moral beings. There can be an 
overlapping consensus on the justification of human rights because several religions 
hold that humans have equal worth and are moral beings. Therefore, Charney (1999, 
845) continues that the very concept of human rights is endangered if too much room 
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for cultural interpretations is given. Therefore we should emphasise the fact of 
humanity as the real justification of human rights. If there were several, culturally 
determined justifications of human rights, we could no longer talk about universal 
human rights. Therefore, we must emphasise the fact that humanity is the only 
relevant transcultural justification of human rights. This is how we can say whether 
human rights are respected or not.  
 
However, does it matter on what basis universal human rights are constructed? Do we 
really need to find a universally acceptable justification of human rights? We should 
look for an unforced consensus on human rights in spite of the possibility of 
disagreement on the ultimate justification of human rights as Taylor (1999b, 124), 
Bell (1999, 855) and Chan (1999, 212) point out. In other words, we need pluralism.  
 
“What variations can we imagine in philosophical justifications or in legal 
forms that would still be compatible with a meaningful universal consensus on 
what really matters to us, the enforceable norms.” (Taylor 1999b, 129) 
 
Consensus is also the very basis of the Law of Peoples. Rawls tries to construct a 
theory on “what really matters to us”, and in the light of the empirical findings he 
succeeded because the informants of the sample did not reject his human rights. It 
does not matter how human rights are justified, and whether we can find arguments 
for “common humanity” or not. What matters is that all persons can accept one 
specific set of human rights and that the values of any culture do not conflict with it. 
Therefore, Charney’s comment is interesting but not relevant. We only need to know 
whether all people with different backgrounds accept the Law of Peoples. This is how 
we can talk about universal human rights.  
 
Actually Rawls says that the human rights defined in the Law of Peoples are neutral 
and express the minimum standards of a well-ordered society. However, Hoffman 
(1995,54) argues that there are no neutral human rights: 
 
“And while non-western states have signed treaties that commit them to 
respect these rights, they are clearly liberal in origin and substance.”  
 
Hoffman’s chain of reasoning goes something like this. There are some treaties that 
regulate human rights and any state can voluntarily ratify them. However, in liberal 
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societies those rights are already respected because the values expressed by human 
rights are inherent in liberal societies. Hence, when non-liberal societies sign treaties 
on human rights, they agree on rights that are not, however, respected within their 
borders. The values expressed by human rights are not inherent in non-liberal 
regimes, and that is why they need to sign treaties. 
 
Hoffman’s argument is dubious. First, the sole non-liberal society in the present 
survey, Tanzania, did accept all of Rawls’s human rights even though the role of 
human rights in Tanzania can be questioned. Second, non-liberal societies are not the 
only ones having signed those treaties. Liberal societies have also given their promise. 
Third, there are some Western societies that are not in conjunction with these 
conventions as Bell (1999, 849) argues: 
 
“…the UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] runs counter to 
the mainstream ideas of  fundamental human rights in the United States, 
meaning those expressed in the U.S Constitution.” 
 
Moreover, Amnesty International has reported on police brutality, death penalty, ill-
treatment in prisons, and death in custody that violate human rights in the USA.5 In 
this light Hoffman’s criticism does not seem valid. If one of the most liberal regimes 
in the world does not respect human rights, and if liberal regimes also sign treaties on 
human rights, Hoffman’s claim cannot stand. Human rights cannot only be liberal in 
substance.  
 
Hoffman also criticises the view that human rights are liberal in origin as well. There 
are other similar opinions (see Donnelly 1999, 68). After the Second World War, 
human rights were needed to protect humans from the evils of society, and the states 
that presented the idea of human rights were liberal.  
 
Whatever the reasons for the acceptance of human rights may have been, it must be 
emphasised that Rawls did not mean human rights to be free from their origins. 
Hence, the discussion started by Hoffman is a bit irrelevant, and he may have 
misunderstood what Rawls wanted to say. Rawls does not try to deny the origin of 
human rights and the context where they were introduced. When he uses “neutral” 
                                                           
5 See http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/ 
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Rawls does not mean that there is no specific origin of human rights. What he wants 
to show is that all societies, both liberal and hierarchical, can and ultimately will 
accept and endorse the set of human rights presented in the Law of Peoples. As we 
have already argued, it seems that Rawls succeeded in constructing such human 
rights. The substance of Rawls’s set of human rights is neutral because all cultures, all 
societies can accept them. As seen above Rawls (idib, 68) supports pluralism:  
 
“…these right do not depend on any particular comprehensive moral 
doctrine or philosophical conception of human nature, such as, for 
example that all human beings are moral persons and have equal 
worth…” 
 
 
Are non-governmental organisations and multinational corporations relevant subjects 
of the Law of Peoples? 
We have already seen that Rawls’s theory of international justice deals with states and 
presents some principles for them. This leads to another problem. There are other 
international actors than states, and those actors have an important, if not significant 
role. Hocking & Smith (1995, 84, 105) point out that multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have a great influence. Some 
scholars have already suggested that the state-system should be abandoned.  
 
There are other powerful actors that set the agenda and rules. Hence, Rawls’s theory 
of international justice can be criticised as deficient. The Law of Peoples does not 
have anything to say what the other actors, such as MNCs and NGOs should do in 
terms of human rights. Should they also respect human rights when doing business 
and seeking profit? The Law of Peoples is based on the old view on international 
relations that only states are the principal actors and only the states determine the 
rules and the name of the game in international affairs. Moreover, Rawls (1993, 46) 
holds that his theory is universal in its reach… 
 
“…once it is extended to give principles for all politically relevant 
subjects…” 
 
Keeping the last in mind, it seems that Rawls’s theory suffers from a flaw because it 
does not give principles for all politically relevant subjects. However, Rawls’s theory 
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can be defended. It is true that although there are other powerful actors, the state 
provides the framework where other actors can seek their aims as Hocking and Smith 
(ibid, 116) point out. In addition, the Law of Peoples is meant to apply to international 
law, norms and practices (see Rawls 1993, 42). In spite of the new emerging actors, 
the state still remain the most important actor in the international arena. Therefore, 
Rawls’s theory can be defended. Rawls (ibid, 73-74) writes that… 
 
“… to achieve this long-run aim [to bring all societies to honor that law and 
to be full and self-standing members of the society of well-ordered societies 
and so secure human rights everywhere] they should establish among 
themselves new institutions and practices to serve as a kind of federative 
center and public forum for their common opinion and policy toward the other 
regimes.” 
 
It is true that Rawls does not mention other actors than societies or states, but the 
quotation above can be interpreted that human rights should be secured everywhere. 
This would also mean setting limits for other actors. However, Rawls does not clearly 
mention other actors than peoples. Therefore it is dubious whether the Law of Peoples 
has attained its goal – to be universal in its reach. 
 
 
4.3. The Law of Peoples in practise 
 
 
Why cannot we expect all Islamic societies to be outlawed regimes? 
Above some more theoretical issues of the Law of Peoples were discussed. Now we 
need to examine how the Law of Peoples works in the light of real world experiences.  
 
Charney (1999, 843) argues that some Islamic states would not agree on Rawls’ set of 
universal human rights. In order to support his argument he refers to Will Kymlicka 
(1995, 82), according to whom some Islamic states have rejected the freedom of 
religion. Hence, Charney argues that Rawls’s non-individualistic (for Charney non-
individualistic is the same as non-liberal) theory does not attain its aim, that of 
constructing a universally acceptable theory of international justice.  
 
If it is true that some Islamic states cannot accept the freedom to change religion, 
Rawls theory fails in terms of its universal aim. Or does it? Kymlicka refers only to 
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“some Islamic states”, and therefore we do not know how many such states there 
exist. In the second stage of his theory Rawls presents the non-ideal theory that deals 
with non-compliance. There are some regimes that do not comply with the rules of 
just society of societies. Peoples that comply with the rules have a duty to bring all 
peoples to honor human rights. The question rises, are these Islamic states ones that 
should be brought to honor human rights, or is Kymlicka’s statement evidence of 
Rawls’s failure?  
 
If we suppose that Kymlicka’s argument applies to all Islamic societies and that 
Rawls’s theory is to apply to the reality the Law of People seems a bit difficult to 
defend. However, we cannot claim that all Islamic societies are outlawed regimes 
because Islam is one of the principal religions in the contemporary world. In addition, 
Kymlicka holds that there are “some” Islamic societies that cannot accept the freedom 
of conscience and religion (rules and principles in Islamic countries tend to vary 
according to interpretations and history).  
 
Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of Kymlicka’s view is that it is 
too ambiguous to be used as an argument against the Law of Peoples. We can only 
doubt the acceptability of the Law of Peoples but we cannot be sure. It is a flaw of the 
present survey that it did not contain any Islamic societies, which would have been 
really important in this respect. There only were 10 Muslims in the sample. Even 
though it can be concluded that they accepted the freedom of conscience and religion, 
this does not offer any reliable evidence for or against. Therefore, it is necessary to 
collect data from Islamic societies in further research.  
 
 
Why do the principles in the Law of Peoples need clarification? 
Next some hypothetical scenarios are presented. Each scenario involves a 
troublesome situation of international affairs and it calls for immediate action. The 
scenarios are solved in accordance with Rawls’s theory.6 By doing so we can see 
whether the Rawlsian theory could solve crises of international politics. If it turns out 
that the Law of Peoples cannot offer any guidelines in solving conflicts, Rawls does 
not attain his goal. 
                                                           
6 The idea for scenarios came from Pertti Pelto who is Professor emeritus at University of Connecticut. 
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The nation of Ruritania (population 4 million) has been experiencing repeated 
terrorist attacks from the neighbouring state of Pungraavia (population 8 million). The 
increasing terrorist attacks (mainly car-bombing of civilian targets) have thus far cost 
approx. 400 lives, mostly women and children. Ruritanian intelligence has identified 3 
main terrorist training and marshalling centres inside Pungraavia, and the military 
chiefs are demanding that they be permitted to carry out a “limited war” to destroy the 
terrorist bases.  
 
For us the question is, what are the rights of Ruritania in this case? It is evident that 
Ruritania would like to stop the car-bombings as soon as possible because its civilians 
are dying. According to Rawls every people has the right to self-defence. The only 
legitimate grounds for initiating warfare is gross violations of human rights. Terrorist 
attacks violate the human rights of Ruritanian civilians – the right to life and security. 
It can be rightfully said that the life and security of Ruritanian civilians is threatened. 
Thus, Ruritania has the right to war. But does this right overrule the right to self-
determination? 
 
We cannot, however, be sure whether Pungraavia is supporting the terrorist attacks or 
not. The attacks come from the territory of Pungraavia, but is the government of 
Pungraavia involved or not? Let us consider both cases. First, let us assume that the 
Pungraavian government is supporting the terrorist raids. In other words, Pungraavia 
grossly violates human rights. Rawls’s aim presented in the second part of the Law of 
Peoples was to bring all societies to honor the Law of Peoples. Therefore the 
international society of well-ordered societies has the right to force and to use all 
means to bring Pungraavia to honor these principles. This would mean that Ruritania 
with other well-ordered peoples could organise a military operation in order to destroy 
the terrorist bases in the territory of Pungraavia.  
 
Next, let us suppose that Pungraavia does not support terrorism. The terrorists just 
happen to have their training and marshalling bases in the territory of Pungraavia. The 
terrorists may get money by practising crime – drugs, sex business, kidnapping, 
smuggling etc. Rawls deals with regimes that do not comply with the Law of Peoples, 
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but he does not suggest what ought to be done with terrorist attacks, and this is a flaw. 
In this case we could emphasise the role of human rights, and their importance.  
 
We could assume that the international society of well-ordered peoples would decide 
to attack terrorism. Pungraavia should take part in the actions of the society of well-
ordered societies in order to stop the car-bombings. It is true that the war would take 
place in the territory of Pungraavia, and if the military operation against the terrorists 
failed, Pungraavia would have some serious reasons to believe that they would also 
suffer from the car-bombing because Pungraavia gave permission to use their land for 
the military operation. If the operation failed, angry terrorists could threaten the 
human rights of Pungraavian people. According to Rawls, all peoples should be free 
and independent. Does that mean that all peoples are free to decide whether they take 
part in such operation against terrorists and out-lawed regimes? The human rights 
should be protected, however. Rawls does not give any priorities, i.e. what is more 
important, the freedom of people or the inviolability of human rights. 
 
We can conclude that as most of the international agreements and principles, the Law 
of Peoples needs some interpretation. We can say that Rawls’s theory needs more 
details because it does not give any priority rules for the principles of international 
justice. 
 
 
Why do Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other conventions on human 
rights not contradict with the Law of Peoples? 
When the set of human rights introduced by Rawls was compared to the one of 
UDHR, only few similarities could be found, which is evident because the set of 
Rawls contains only 6 human rights.7 According to Rawls the universal human rights 
that every culture can endorse are the right to life and security, the right to personal 
property, the right to a certain liberty of conscience, the right to freedom of 
association, the right to emigration and the right to formal equality. The latter one 
refers to natural justice that each case should be treated in the same way when 
preceded in court (see Rawls 1993, 62). Rawls explains the liberty of conscience a bit 
further. According to him humans, whether individuals or members of a society, 
                                                           
7 See UDHR for example in <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>. 
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should be free from slavery, serfdom, forceful occupations, and they should have the 
right to choose their religion. 
 
The set of Rawls’s covers only 8 articles (Articles 3, 4, 7, 13.2, 17.1, 18, 20.1, 23.4) 
of UDHR that is considered to be the very heart of human rights law in spite of its 
declarative nature. UDHR is not the only international agreement on human rights. In 
1966 two legally binding conventions on cultural, social, economical, civil and 
political rights were made within the framework of UN. After that a huge amount of 
conventions on specific sets of human rights have been given (see Ihmisoikeusliitto 
Ry 1995). Keeping the above in mind, we need to ask what is the role of these other 
conventions if the Law of Peoples is to be applied to practice? Of course we could 
hold that Rawls’s theory should not be examined in the light of reality, but his very 
aim was to construct a theory that would work as a guide in the affairs between states 
(see Rawls 1993, 42). 
 
If we suppose that Rawls’s theory is valid and it applies to international law and 
practices we need an answer. The set of human rights presented in the Law of Peoples 
could be seen as the fundamental one. This set presents the very core of human rights. 
If we suppose that this set is universal, are states and other international actors 
compelled to respect the other human rights regulated in the hundreds of conventions? 
We could argue that other human rights are not relevant because they are not 
universal, i.e. they are not the real human rights. 
 
On the other hand, we need to consider the list of principles presented by Rawls. 
Rawls argues that all the states are to honor their agreements and they are responsible 
for their actions. Moreover, peoples are equal and parties of their own agreements. In 
other words, if a people have agreed on a treaty, convention or such, it is compelled to 
follow that agreement. Therefore we could say that if peoples agreed upon more 
human rights, they were compelled to comply with them. Peoples have power to sign 
and not to sign. No people is forced to sign if its culture contradicts the convention in 
hand. Hence, those hundreds of conventions on human rights could not be seen as 
contradicting the Law of Peoples. 
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Does it make any sense to examine a normative theory with empirical methods? 
There is one major problem to be solved before we can assess the Law of Peoples on 
the basis of the present empirical study: can we test a normative theory with empirical 
means? First, we must understand what “normative theory” means. “Normative” 
refers to norms guiding our actions. If we have a normative theory of international 
justice, it gives us guidance as to how the conditions of international relations should 
be arranged. A normative theory of that kind presents rules and prescriptions about 
how things ought to be, not how they are.  
 
A theory in turn refers to a coherent presentation that binds together many individual 
cases (see The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995). Philosophical theories 
typically present different possible worlds, even non-existing ideal worlds, and hence, 
it is not common to examine the validity and soundness of such a theory by empirical 
means. This is to say that philosophical theories are usually based on a priori 
arguments. A claim is a priori when its justification is not based on any empirical 
evidence. Consequently an a posteriori claim, i.e. empirical claim, is one that is based 
on experience. A theory is confirmed or disconfirmed by testing its internal 
consistency, smoothness, simplicity and inter-theoretic support and its correspondence 
with facts.  
 
The Law of Peoples is a coherentist theory, not a foundationalist one. According to 
foundationalism there are some fundamental beliefs on which other beliefs are based. 
The other beliefs are justified indirectly and the fundamental beliefs do not need any 
justification. This means that a system of beliefs is a pyramid where the fundamental 
beliefs lie at the bottom and the other beliefs are above them. Empiricism also is a 
foundationalist theory. However, this time the fundamental beliefs are linked to real 
world experiences, i.e. they arise from some empirical facts. 
 
Law of Peoples is a coherentist theory. There are no fundamental beliefs in it. Instead 
the beliefs support each other and their coherence justifies the system. Thus, a belief 
is justified if it is a part of a coherent system of beliefs. The more there are systematic 
connections between beliefs, the more coherent the system of beliefs is. If there are 
some beliefs that weaken the coherence of the system, they are removed. Coherentism 
holds that real world experiences are not necessary to justify the system of beliefs or a 
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theory. It is only required that the beliefs are not logically contradictory and rather 
support each other. Therefore, Rawls does not seem to need any empirical evidence. It 
only is required that Rawls’s arguments and deductions form a coherent, self-
supporting system. 
 
We can now understand the problem we have to cope with. If philosophy deals with 
possible worlds, does it make any sense to examine a philosophical theory with 
empirical methods? Consequently if the theory is based on a priori knowledge, 
arguments and justifications, how can it fit the facts? If the theory begins in a 
hypothetical situation that has never occurred, why should we take it seriously? Is it 
just another brain puzzle for philosophers dealing with possible worlds? If the theory 
is not based on the facts of the real world, why should it be binding? If one man, even 
though a professor, deduces a theory that is presumably sound, why should we test it? 
Why should we even examine the theory in the light of empirical facts if it does not 
concern the real world anyway? We need to find the connection between reality and 
the hypothetical situation sketched by the theory. 
 
Rawls (1983, 21) answers that we should take interest in his principles because we do 
accept the conditions of the original position. This is to say that we find it appealing 
and reasonable that actors do not profit from a natural fortune, that their personal 
conception of the good should not affect their choice of the principles of justice, that 
they are rational and do not suffer from envy, and that the principles adopted in the 
original position match our convictions of justice or extend them in the right way. 
Moreover, Rawls claims that the Law of Peoples ties together our convictions and 
moral judgements into one coherent view. If the theory is to tie together our moral 
convictions, should we not see whether it really corresponds to the facts?  
 
The theory presents a set of principles of justice based on a hypothetical situation. Let 
us suppose that Rawls’s theory is logical and well-founded and that our considered 
moral convictions do not match with the theory. What should we think of this 
situation? Should we consider that Rawls has failed because experience (i.e. our 
convictions) does not support his theory, or should we consider our moral convictions 
to be wrong? If the theory is logical and sound, then should we not revise our moral 
judgements? We might be wrong and Rawls right, and therefore the empirical fact 
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that our convictions do not fit Rawls's theory cannot tell us much about the validity of 
the Law of Peoples. However, if we found out that the considered convictions of the 
informants with different cultural backgrounds do not match with Rawls's theory, he 
is in trouble. His theory could not be as universal as he claims. 
 
Let us look more closely at Rawls's argumentation. He claims that the justification of 
the theory lies in what he calls the reflective equilibrium of our considered moral 
judgements and the principles of justice. It has two phases. First, we try to reach the 
narrow reflective equilibrium where the principles are justified if they cohere with our 
considered moral judgements. Then we move on to the wide reflective equilibrium 
that starts with the narrow reflective equilibrium and then adds to it some 
philosophical and empirical background beliefs. The aim is to find the equilibrium 
where 1) our principles of justice, 2) our background beliefs and 3) our moral 
judgements match. In Rawls’s opinion this is the only sort of proof that is possible in 
normative matters. 
 
”In any case, it is obviously impossible to develop a substantive theory 
of justice founded solely on truths of logic and definition. The analysis 
of moral concepts and the a priori, however traditionally understood, is 
too slender a basis. Moral philosophy must be free to use contingent 
assumptions and general facts as it pleases. There is no other way to 
give an account of our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium.” 
    (1989, 51) 
 
However, Rawls never shows how the reflective equilibrium is reached in practice. 
How can we reach it and how can we know that we have reached it?  
 
Why is Rawls so confident? He (1983, 50) claims that moral philosophy is similar to 
linguistics: 
 
”If we can describe one person’s sense of grammar we shall surely know 
many things about the general structure of grammar.” 
 
We only need the reader’s and the writer’s (Rawls’s) moral conceptions in order to 
know the whole form of moral conception because we all possess similar moral 
conceptions. This is why Rawls is so confident that his principles match our 
considered judgements. In other words, we readers are invited to see first if we can 
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reach the reflective equilibrium and second if this equilibrium matches Rawls’s 
principles. Rawls believes that every rational reader must answer both questions in the 
affirmative. 
 
If we think that we need survey, then we argue that the survey is needed because of 
the claims of relativism and pluralism. Rawls said that philosophy is similar to 
linguistics – we need only a few persons’ knowledge to know a great deal about 
grammar. We would like to add that, just as there are different languages so there are 
many cultures with different moral codes. If we take only an English-speaking people, 
then we do not know anything about German, Finnish or Swedish grammar. Hence, 
we need many informants with different characteristics and different cultural 
backgrounds. We need to study different moral views in order to know whether 
Rawls’s theory is really as universal as he claims.  
 
It is even possible that we may err in our moral convictions. Rawls takes some 
principles and some considered judgements and fits them to a coherent whole. How 
do we know that he chose the right ones and on what basis he did it? As Lammenranta 
(1993, 160) argues, it is always possible to replace a justified system of beliefs with 
another system that fills the requirements of coherentism (the beliefs do not conflict 
and they support each other): we simply replace the beliefs with their negations. 
Therefore, it is possible that a justified theory of coherentism conflicts with the real 
world experiences. 
 
However, Lammenranta (ibid, 191) continues that this criticism is only relevant in the 
case of a narrow reflective equilibrium that is based on internalism. According to 
internalism we can find the justified beliefs by considering our own beliefs. In a way, 
the justified beliefs come from the inside. However, the wide reflective equilibrium 
begins in the narrow one. First we form different, alternative systems of narrow 
reflective equilibrium and then choose the one that fits the background beliefs best. 
The wide reflective equilibrium breaks free from internalism. 
 
It can be argued that we can still form alternative wide reflective equilibriums by 
changing the background beliefs. How do we know that we have chosen the right and 
relevant background beliefs? How do we know that we have reached the right wide 
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reflective equilibrium? We still do not know whether the considered judgements of 
informants with different cultural backgrounds factually match the principles in the 
Law of Peoples. These questions are thorny and I do not claim having solved them, 
but hopefully I have succeeded in putting forward arguments for why it makes sense 
to study a normative theory with empirical means.  
 
However, I must admit one flaw in the present study. It would have been better to 
carry out the study by interviews. First, I could have explained the conditions of the 
original position and asked if the informants agreed with them. Then, I could have 
asked whether they agreed with the principles or which principles they would like to 
adopt. This is because Rawls claims that his principles are justifiable if we can accept 
the conditions of the original position and if the principles match our considered 
judgements. However, I also wanted to study the role of culture and to see if the thesis 
of relativism holds or not. At this point of studies it was impossible to travel and make 
an adequate number of interviews with informants from different cultural 
backgrounds, and this is the reason I decided to use the questionnaire.  
 
 
Did the informants accept the Law of Peoples? 
First I must emphasise that the data was based on a sample, not on a big random 
sample that would have been necessary to conclude whether the theory is truly 
universally applicable or not. I could not take such a random sample because I lacked 
money and time. Therefore, we can only see whether a group of informants from 
Western societies and from one African society could accept Rawls’s theory. If these 
societies cannot accept Rawls’s principles, we have a good reason to doubt the 
universality of Rawls’s theory.  
 
Cultural relativists claim that culture moulds our thinking and values and that there 
are no universal values due to the great diversity of cultures. Therefore, consensus 
analysis was performed in order to examine whether the informants’ answers were 
culturally defined. According to the results (see table 4) the data was culturally 
defined, i.e. relative. The question is, however, what is the culture that defined the 
informants’ answers?  
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The consensus coefficient of each nationality, sex, age and religion category were 
rather high. In most of the cases the coefficient was more than 9 except in the case of 
Muslims and informants aged 39-49. Therefore, it seems that each category, except 
for Muslims and informants aged 39-49, form their own cultural domain based on 
nationality, sex, age, and religion. These explanatory variables determine the 
informants’ thinking. The results of logistic regression analysis also support this 
conclusion because some significant differences could be found. 
 
According to the regression analysis there were significant differences between 
American and Polish, Finnish and German informants. The Finnish and German 
informants were significantly different from the American ones as regards proposition 
9: people have no right to make up irresponsibility in caring of their land by conquest 
in war. Moreover, the Finns and Germans were significantly different from the 
Americans and women from men in their opinions as to whether people have a right 
to make up for irresponsibility in taking care of their land by migrating.  
 
There was also difference between sexes regarding the proposition that human rights 
should not depend on any particular philosophical doctrine. The Germans were 
different from the Americans and informants aged 28-38 from the ones aged 39-49 
concerning the proposition that everyone should have the right to emigrate. The 
Polish informants were more eager than the Americans to accept that peoples should 
make every effort within their means to give aid to peoples in response to natural 
disasters such as famine, draught, cyclones etc. The Polish informants also differed 
from the Americans in the case of the proposition that each society burdened by 
unfavourable conditions should be assisted towards conditions that makes the 
observance of international law and human rights possible. The Muslims differed 
from the Christians regarding proposition 14 according to which peoples are to honor 
human rights. 
 
However, we can also notice that all informants, regardless of nationality, sex, age 
and religion had something in common because the consensus coefficient of the 
whole data was the highest of all (0,9938). Now, I do not have information about what 
that common factor might be. At the first look, it seems that all the societies were 
western. However, this is not true because I also had data from Tanzania. Even 
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though the legal system of the United Republic of Tanzania is based on the English 
Common law it cannot be considered liberal8. The second observation is that all the 
informants were university students. Now, the question is whether this common 
characteristics caused the prevailing consensus? This would require that the university 
systems in these countries to be similar. However, we cannot be sure of this. Hence, 
we need to look for some other possible explanations. We notice that all informants 
had one thing in common that could not be denied – they all were humans.  
 
However, nationality, sex, age and religion did form culturally significant domains. 
What does this mean? It means that all these domains form their own cultures and the 
informants within them answered similarly to the questions of international justice. At 
the same time, these cultural domains had something in common that is indicated by 
the coefficient of the whole data. First it seems that the findings point at idealism 
according to which humanity is the key to universally accepted principles of 
international justice. There is a common factor to all these culturally defined groups, 
and we concluded that it was humanity. Even though culturally defined groups had 
their own opinions, the intrinsic virtue of humanity shaped their concept of 
international justice. Therefore, it seems that we have found a common opinion on the 
Law of Peoples. There is another possible explanation, however. 
 
These findings also refer to what I called cultural pluralism. According cultural 
pluralism cultures have something in common in spite of their differences. We can 
construct universals on the basis of shared values, and according to the consensus 
analysis there was common opinion concerning Rawlsian international justice among 
the different culturally defined groups. Therefore the present survey does not support 
cultural relativism. Actually, it was expected that the findings would support 
pluralism because Rawls tried to construct a theory that societies with different 
cultural backgrounds could accept. It seems that Rawls had succeeded in this task 
because there was a common opinion concerning the Law of Peoples.  
 
The findings support idealism and pluralism. As argued above we should focus on the 
shared view on international justice because that is the way we can reach our goal. If 
we keep asking why people accept certain principles we are stranded on sidetrack. It 
                                                           
8 See http://www.emulateme.com/content/tanzania.htm 
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does not matter if the shared view is based on the virtue of humanity or on similarities 
between cultures. Now, we have some evidence that points at that common factor, and 
we should focus on it. Therefore the question becomes, what is this common opinion? 
 
Let us turn to table 1, which illustrates the average approval and concludes that all 
response groups accepted the Law of Peoples. However, we can notice some 
significant differences in the average approval. The B-value of the Polish informants 
is 1.4189 and the significance is 0.0212. The B-value is an estimate of the change in 
the dependent variable (average approval) that can be attributed to a change of one 
unit in the independent variable (nationality is Polish). This indicates (to put more 
simply) that the Polish informants differed significantly from the Americans. We 
concluded that according to table 1 all response groups accepted the Law of Peoples. 
How can these two findings exist simultaneously? The significant differences in the 
average approval exist in terms of the degree of endorsement. The Polish students 
were more eager to accept Rawls’s theory than the Americans. Even though a 
significant difference between the Polish and American informants exists, they all 
accepted Rawls’s theory when the average approval was examined (see table 1). Is 
this the common opinion that we had sought? 
 
However, we cannot base our conclusion solely on average approval. We need to 
consider each proposition individually, i.e. to look at tables 2 and 3. The informants 
unanimously approved propositions 2, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22 and 23. In these cases the 
endorsement values were greater than 4. It seems that the informants agreed upon the 
following principles: all people should be free and independent, peoples should be 
responsible for their actions, peoples are to honor human rights and everyone should 
have the rights to life and security, formal equality, liberty of conscience and religion. 
Moreover, it was approved that peoples have no right to violate the human rights of a 
minority within their borders and that they should make every effort within their 
means to give aid to peoples in response to natural disasters. Only 8 cases out of 24 
were clearly accepted. Even though we had found the common opinion, we must 
question the universal applicability of the Law of Peoples. 
 
Another question is whether there were some principles that all response groups 
rejected. In order to answer the question we need to define the value in Likert's scale 
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that implied rejection. In Likert’s scale 1 and 2 stood for rejection, 3 for “cannot say”, 
4 and 5 for acceptance. What does choice 3 actually mean? There are two 
possibilities: 1) it simply stood for rejection because the informants did not choose 4 
or 5 referring to acceptance, 2) it neither stood for acceptance nor rejection but for 
doubt. Both these possibilities are discussed below. 
 
First, let us consider that the informants’ answers from 1 to 3 stood for rejection. It 
seems that Rawls had failed because the informants rejected proposition 7 
unanimously, i.e. the endorsement values were less than 3,5 (see tables 2 & 3). In 
addition, only the Swedish informants accepted propositions 6 and 8, and only the 
Finnish and German informants could accept propositions 9 and 10. If we follow this 
chain of reasoning, we need to answer why I used the scale 1-5 in the first place. If I 
had wanted to have clear-cut answers I could have used the 1-4 scale where 1 and 2 
stood for rejection and 3 and 4 for acceptance. But I thought that the scale 1-5 could 
give us more information and therefore we can turn to the second possibility. 
 
Second, let us assume that the values 1 and 2 implied rejection. We notice that on this 
assumption the informants did not reject any proposition. But there were only 8 
propositions that all response groups clearly accepted (the endorsement value greater 
than 4) and at the same time there is no proposition that all groups rejected. What 
does this mean? What did the informants think about the rest of the propositions?  
 
We notice that no response group accepted propositions 6-8, and in the rest of the 
cases they had different opinions. Perhaps these 7 countries (Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, Poland, Germany, Tanzania and USA) are those out-lawed regimes that 
Rawls described in his theory. In that case, the members of good-standing society of 
well-ordered societies should bring these seven societies to honor the Law of Peoples. 
This argument cannot hold here because none of the representatives of these seven 
countries actually rejected the propositions. Because in most cases the endorsement 
values were around 3, we can only conclude that the informants were not sure 
whether to accept or reject these propositions. In other words, there was doubt among 
the informants. 
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Moreover, there is one group of informants who did not accept one of the 
propositions. The endorsement value of the Tanzanian informants in the case of 
proposition 9 was 2,24. This value already implied rejection because it is closer to 2 
than 3. This seems that we have some evidence that one society rejected Rawls’s 
theory. As in the case of propositions 6-8, we need to consider the possibility that 
Tanzania is an outlawed society. On the other hand, it can be the case that the 
Tanzanians’ rejection implies Rawls’s failure. Whatever the conclusion is, we cannot 
argue whether Tanzania is an outlawed society or whether Rawls fails. In order to 
conclude with certainty that Rawls’ theory fails we would have needed evidence that 
several societies did not accept the Law of Peoples. On the basis of this survey we can 
only state with certainty that these 7 societies did not accept all the principles of the 
Law of Peoples. If the informants were not sure whether to accept or reject the 
propositions, it must be the case that the Law of Peoples did not convince them.  
 
What can be thus concluded about the universal acceptability of the Law of Peoples? 
If a group of mainly Western societies did not find the Law of Peoples convincing, 
what is the probability that other Western and non-liberal societies could accept it? If 
a theory that has a liberal foundation did not convince a group of mainly Western 
informants, why should we expect that it could convince informants from non-liberal 
societies? I argue that without another more profound and broad survey we cannot. 
Therefore, further study is needed. 
 
The Law of Peoples did not convince the informants, and therefore in the light of 
these findings Rawls has not succeeded in constructing a universally applicable theory 
of international justice. 
 
 
Are the outcomes of the statistical survey due to the differences between nationalities 
or to an ambiguous questionnaire? 
We need to consider the criticism that was received. In the USA, Sweden, Tanzania, 
Norway and Poland the questionnaire was not totally understood. It was also noticed 
that no response group accepted propositions 6, 7 and 8, and that in most of the cases 
the endorsement values were around 3. Therefore we must ask whether the problem 
was in the Law of Peoples or in the questionnaire. Perhaps the questionnaire was too 
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difficult to understand. This would explain the doubt among the informants, i.e. that 
the answers were near to 3 and that propositions 6-8 were not accepted. Consequently 
we must ask if Rawls’s theory is still valid and sound. 
 
The propositions in the questionnaire were directly based on Rawls’s theory. Could it 
be that the propositions were out of context, i.e. the reader would have needed the 
whole theory in order to understand the questions? This implies that interviews could 
have been a better way to gain information.  
 
I received some comments that could be interpreted this way. For some Swedish and 
American informants the questions were too difficult to understand. Also professor 
Steve Borgatti from Boston College mentioned that the propositions were not easy to 
understand. It is likely that I was too naïve to believe that students could easily 
understand Rawls’s sentences. He writes in a difficult way, and therefore it can be the 
case that I did not understand his writings, either. Therefore, it is more likely that the 
propositions were too unconnected and vague. In other words, I should have presented 
the basic idea of Rawls’s theory in plain English.  
 
There is one interesting point that I have to make. The results of Finland and 
Germany, where the English questionnaire was not used, did not imply rejection. In 
the other countries the questionnaire based on Rawls’s original text was used. This 
could imply that the translated questionnaires were easier to understand because they 
were processed further.  
 
For instance, after examining the results of the statistical survey it was noticed that 
there was a significant difference in average approval (see table 6.) between the USA 
and Poland. The Polish informants were significantly more eager to accept the 
propositions. Perhaps the ambiguous questionnaire could explain this? It is hardly 
likely that the American informants had more difficulties to understand English 
questionnaire than Polish informants. Perhaps it is the other way round – because the 
Polish informants did not understand the details of the questionnaire, it was easier to 
accept. Whatever the case is, perhaps it could have been avoided by conducting 
interviews or by making a questionnaire in plain English.  
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Conclusion 
I concluded that Rawls’s theory subordinated non-liberal societies. Rawls began with 
liberal societies and then asked what non-liberal ones could accept. However, all later 
agreements were subordinated to earlier ones. Therefore, non-liberal societies could 
not freely choose the principles of international justice that were compatible with their 
culture. The Law of Peoples is liberal in its starting point and therefore in substance as 
well. 
 
The survey pointed at pluralism because the different, culturally defined groups had 
something in common. I found a common opinion on the Law of Peoples. I could not 
conclude that the informants rejected the Law of Peoples. On the other hand, they did 
not accept it either. The informants doubted the propositions based on the Law of 
Peoples. Even though the sample was too small and the method of collecting the data 
was criticised, the study was important. Now there is a good reason to continue 
studying the topic because the Law of Peoples did not convince a group of mainly 
Western informants. The scope needs to broadened and the method of collecting the 
data changed and then perhaps we can answer with certainty whether the Law of 
Peoples is as universal as Rawls claims.  
 
International justice needs more attention among academics, and not only in terms of 
theory. We should try to find the human rights that are compatible with most of the 
cultures. We need both: empirical surveys to find universally founded principles of 
international justice and theories that can give an apt starting point for surveys. It is 
true that such an empirical survey is difficult to conduct, but without trying there is no 
answer about the substance of international justice. 
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Appendix 1. English questionnaire to Sweden 
Dear responder 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the points of view on universal human 
rights of different cultures. The research is conducted in eight countries. Your answer 
is important that any conclusions can be made on the topic. Your identity will not 
come out in any way in the course of the research. We ask you kindly to hand the 
questionnaire over to the person who gave it to you after answering to the questions. 
We are happy to answer to any questions concerning the research that you may want 
to pose (Email: apuhakk@cc.joensuu.fi). The findings of the research are to be 
presented in the following site by the end of the year 2000 
(www.joensuu.fi/apuhakk/~index.html).  
 
  The University of Joensuu 
  The faculty of social policy 
Finland 
 
 
Professor Mikko A. Salo  Student of social sciences Arttu Puhakka 
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Instructions: 
Next to the each argument/contention is a scale from one to five. Encircle the choice 
that corresponds with your own opinion on matter. 
1= Yes, I strongly agree, 2= I agree, 3= Cannot say, 4= I disagree, 5= No, I strongly 
disagree 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. The freedom and independence of people is to be equal by 
other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. No people has the right to self-determination or to secession 
at the expense of subjugating of another people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Peoples are equal and parties of their own agreements. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defence. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Peoples have no right to war. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. The only legitimate ground of the right to war is defence of 
human rights. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Except the violation of human rights peoples are to observe a 
duty of non-interference. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. People cannot make up for irresponsibility in caring of their 
land by conquest in war or by migrating into other peoples’ 
territory without consent. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Peoples are responsible of their actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Peoples are to observe certain restrictions on the conduct of 
war. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Peoples are to honor human rights. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Human rights are not dependent on any particular 
philosophical doctrine or so. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Everyone has the right to life and security. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Everyone has the right to personal property. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Everyone has the right of association. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Everyone has the right to emigration. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Everyone has the right to formal equality. 1 2 3 4 5 
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20. Everyone has the right to liberty of conscience and to 
religion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Peoples have no right to breach the human rights of certain 
minority within their borders. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Peoples should agree certain provisions for mutual aid 
between peoples in times of famine and draught. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. Each society burdened by the unfavourable conditions 
should be assisted towards conditions that makes the 
observance of international law and human rights possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
The place of study and faculty: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Nationality: ___________________________________________________________ 
Countries where you have lived more than five years: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Age:_________________________________________________________________ 
Sex:_________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-
OPERATION !!! 
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Appendix 2. English questionnaire 
Dear respondent 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine different cultural views on the universality 
of the human rights. The research is being conducted in eight countries. Your answer 
is important that any conclusions can be made from the topic. The anonymity of 
responders is guaranteed. We ask you to hand kindly the filled questionnaire over to 
the person who distributed them. Moreover, we will be happy to answer to any 
questions concerning the research that you may want to pose (Email: 
apuhakk@cc.joensuu.fi). The findings of the research will be presented at the 
following site by the end of the year 2000 (www.joensuu.fi/apuhakk/~index.html).  
 
 The University of Joensuu 
 The Department of Social Policy, Finland 
 
 
Professor Mikko A. Salo  Student of social sciences Arttu Puhakka 
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Instructions: 
Next to the each statement is a scale from one to five. Encircle the choice that 
corresponds with your own opinion on matter. 
1= Yes, I strongly agree, 2= I agree, 3= Cannot say, 4= I disagree, 5= No, I strongly 
disagree 
 
1. Peoples should be free and independent. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. All peoples should be equally free and independent. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. No people have the right to subjugate other people. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Peoples are equal and parties of their own agreements. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defence. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Peoples have no right to war. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. The only legitimate ground for initiating warfare is in the 
case of gross violations of human rights. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The only legitimate ground for intervention is in the case of 
gross violations of human rights. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. People have no right to make up for irresponsibility in caring 
of their land by conquest in war. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. People have no right to make up for irresponsibility in 
caring of their land by migrating into other peoples’ territory 
without consent. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Peoples should be responsible for their actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Peoples are to observe certain restrictions on the conduct of 
war. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Peoples are to honor human rights. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Human rights should not depend on any particular 
philosophical doctrine. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Everyone should have the right to life and security. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Everyone should have the right to personal property. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Everyone should have the right of association. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Everyone should have the right to emigration. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Everyone should have the right to formal equality. 1 2 3 4 5 
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21. Everyone should have the right to liberty of conscience and 
to religion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Peoples have no right to violate the human rights of certain 
minority (e.g. religious or ethnic one) within their borders. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. Peoples should make every effort within their means to 
give aid to peoples in response to natural disasters such as 
famine, flood, draught, cyclones etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Each society burdened by the unfavourable conditions (e.g 
lack of technological know-how, political traditions, natural 
resources) should be assisted towards conditions that makes the 
observance of international law and human rights possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
The place of study and department: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Nationality: ___________________________________________________________ 
Countries where you have lived more than five years: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Age:_________________________________________________________________ 
Sex:_________________________________________________________________ 
Religion: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-
OPERATION! 
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Appendix 3. German questionnaire 
Sehr geehrte/r Umfrageteilnehmer/in 
 
Mit dieser Umfrage, die sich an Universitätsstudenten in acht Ländern wendet, sollen 
die Vorstellungen verschiedener Nationalitäten zu den universalen Menschenrechten 
untersucht werden. Ihre Antwort ist wichtig, damit gültige Sclussfolgerungen gezogen 
werden können. Ihre Anonymität ist gewährleistet, sämtliche Daten werden 
vertraulich behandelt. Wir bitten Sie, den Fragebogen auszufüllen und ihn an die 
Person zurückzugeben, von der Sie ihn erhalten haben. Sollten Sie Fragen zu unserer 
Untersuchung haben, geben wir Ihnen gerne Antwort (Email: 
apuhakk@cc.joensuu.fi). Die Ergebnisse hoffen wir spätestens Ende nächsten Jahres 
im Internet vorstellen zu können (www.cc.joensuu.fi/apuhakk~/index.html) 
 
 Universität Joensuu 
 Institut für Sozialpolitik 
 
Professor Mikko A. Salo    Student Arttu Puhakka 
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Hinweise zum Ausfüllen des Fragebogens 
 
Neben jeder Behauptung finden Sie eine Skala von eins bis fünf, auf der Sie bitte die 
Ihrer Meinung entsprechende Zahl markieren. 
1 = Ja, ich bin absolut derselben Ansicht 
2 = Ich stimme zu 
3 = Unentschieden 
4 = Ich stimme nicht zu 
5 = Nein, ich bin entschieden anderer Ansicht 
 
1. Jede Nation sollte frei und unabhängig sein. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Frei und unabhängige Nationen sollten gleichberechtigt sein. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Eine Nation kann ihr Selbstbestimmungsrecht nur auf 
eigenem Territorium anwenden. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Beim Abschluss von Verträgen sind die Nationen 
gleichberechtigte Partner. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Eine Nation hat das Recht auf Selbstverteidigung. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Eine Nation hat kein Recht, Krieg zu führen. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Einziger berechtigter Kriegsgrund ist die Verteidigung der 
Meschenrechte. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Nur Menschenrechtsverletzungen berechtigen eine Nation 
zur Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten einer anderen 
Nation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Wenn eine Nation ihr Territorium verantwortungslos 
behandelt hat, und es zerstört worden ist, hat sie nicht das 
Recht, mit kriegerischen Mitteln neue Gebiete als Ersatz für die 
zerstörten zu beschaffen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Wenn eine Nation ihr Territorium verantwortungslos 
behandelt hat, und es zerstört worden ist, hat sie nicht das 
Recht, ohne Erlaubnis auf Gebiet einer anderen Nation 
überzusiedeln, um so die eigenen zerstörten Gebiete zu 
ersetzen. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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11. Eine Nation muss die von ihr abgeschlossenen Verträge 
einhalten. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Eine Nation ist für ihre Taten verantwortlich. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Eine Nation muss die vereinbarten Regeln der 
Kriegführung einhalten. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Eine Nation muss die Menschenrechte respektieren. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Die Menschenrechte sind universal und stehen über 
religiösen und philosophischen Dogmen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Jeder Mensch sollte das Recht auf Leben und Sicherheit 
haben. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Jeder Mensch sollte das Recht auf persönliches Eigentum 
haben. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jeder Mensch sollte Versammlungsfreiheit genießen. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Jeder Mensch sollte das Recht auf Verlassen des Landes 
haben. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Jeder Mensch sollte das Recht auf gleichberechtigte 
Behandlung haben. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Jeder Mensch sollte Religions- und Gewissensfreiheit 
genießen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Eine Nation hat kein Recht, die Menschenrechte einer 
innerhalb ihrer Grenzen wohnenden (z.B. religiösen oder 
etnischen) Minderheit zu verletzen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. Nationen sollten einanderen bei drohender Hungersnot oder 
Trockenheit helfen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Eine Nation sollte das Recht auf Hilfe zur Erlangung 
solcher Verhältnisse haben, die die Einhaltung internationalen 
Rechts und die Respektierung der Menschenrechte 
ermöglichen (ausreichend politisches und technologisches 
Know-How sowie natürliche Ressourcen). 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Hochschule und Institut: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Nationalität:___________________________________________________________ 
Länder, in denen Sie länger als fünf Jahre gewohnt haben: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Alter: _______________________________________________________________ 
Geschlecht: __________________________________________________________ 
Religion: ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 VIELEN DANKE FÜR IHRE ANTWORTEN ! 
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Appendix 4. French questionnaire 
Monsieur/Madame/Madamoiselle 
 
Le but de cette recherche est d’étudier le point de vue des différentes cultures 
concernant l’universalité des droits de l’homme. Cette recherche s’effectue dans huit 
pays. Il est important que vous répondiez à ce questionnaire afin que l’on puisse en 
tirer des conclusions. Votre anonymité sera garanti(e). De plus, il vous faudra que 
vous retourniez ce questionnaire, une fois rempli, à celui qui vous l’aura distribué. Si 
vous avez la moindre question à poser concernant cette recherche, n’hesitez pas à 
nous joindre (Email: apuhakk@cc.joensuu.fi). Si vous le souhaitez, vous pourrez 
consulter les résultats de cette étude à la fin de l’annee 2000, sur le site suivant 
(www.joensuu.fi/apuhakk/~index.html). 
 
 
     L’université de 
Joensuu, Finlande 
     Le département de 
sciences sociales 
 
 
 
 Mikko A. Salo (Professeur en sciences politiques) 
 
 Arttu Puhakka (Etudiant en sciences politiques) 
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Instructions 
 
A chaque affirmation correspond cinq reponses possible. Cochez la case de votre 
choix. 
1= Oui, je suis tout à fait d’accord, 2= Je suis d’accord, 3= Je ne sais pas, 4= Je ne 
suis pas d’accord, 5= Non, je suis totalement en désaccord. 
 
1. Les peuples devraient être libres et indépendants. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Les peuples libres et indépendants devraient être égaux. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Un peuple peut utiliser de son droit de self-determination 
seulement sur son propre territoire. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Les peuples sont égaux devant ses propres conventions. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Les peuples ont le droit d’autodéfense. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Les peuples n’ont pas de droit de guerre. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Le seul prétexte legitimé du droit de guerre est la defénse des 
droits de l’homme. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. La seule raison legitimée de l’intervention est la violation 
des droits de l’homme. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Les peuples ne peuvent pas substituer leur territoires souillés 
à cause de leur irresponsibilite par une conquête. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Les peuples ne peuvent pas substituer leur territoires 
souillés à cause de leur irresponsibilite par une émigration dans 
le territoire d’autres sans consentement. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Les peuples doivent respecter les conventions et les 
entreprises. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Chaque peuple est responsable de ses decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Les peuples doivent suivre certains restrictions de conduite 
de guerre. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Les peuples doivent honorer les droits de l’homme. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Les droits de l’homme ne devraient dépendre d’aucune 
doctrine philosophique. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Chacun devrait avoir le droit de vie et de securité. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Chacun devrait avoir le droit de propriété privée. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Chacun devrait avoir le droit d’association. 1 2 3 4 5 
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19. Chacun devrait avoir le droit d’émigration. 
20. Chacun devrait avoir le droit d’égalite formelle. 
1
1 
2
2 
3
3 
4
4 
5   
5 
21. Chacun devrait avoir le droit de liberté de conscience et de 
religion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Les peuples n’ont pas de droit de violer les droits de 
l’homme de certaines minorités à l’intérieur de leurs frontières. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. Les peuples devraient établir un fond pour l’aide mutuelle 
en temps des catastrophes naturelles (par exemple, sècheresse,  
famine et innondation). 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Chaque société touchée par des conditions défavorables (on 
manque de savoir-faire technologique et political et de 
ressources naturelles) devrait être assistée pour avoir accès au 
droit internationaux et aux droits de l’homme. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Votre lieu d’étude et votre matière/UFR: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Nationalité: ___________________________________________________________ 
Les pays oú vous avez habité(e) plus que cinq ans: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Age: ________________________________________________________________ 
Sexe: ________________________________________________________________ 
Religion: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 MERCI DE VOTRE ATTENTION ET DE VOTRE COOPERATION 
!!! 
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Appendix 5. Finnish questionnaire 
Hyvä vastaaja 
 
 
Tällä kyselyllä pyritään kartoittamaan eri kansallisuuksien käsityksiä universaaleista 
ihmisoikeuksista. Kysely tehdään kahdeksassa maassa yliopisto-opiskelijoille. 
Vastauksesi on tärkeä, jotta johtopäätöksiä voidaan tehdä asian tiimoilta. 
Henkilöllisyytesi ei tule esille, ja kaikki tiedot käsitellään luottamuksellisesti. 
Pyydämme sinua vastaamaan kyselyyn ja palauttamaan sen sinulle antaneelle 
henkilölle. Vastaamme mielellämme tutkielmaan liittyviin kysymyksiin (Email: 
apuhakk@cc.joensuu.fi). Tulokset pyritään esittämään ensi vuoden loppuun mennessä 
internetissä (www.joensuu.fi/apuhakk/~index.html) 
 
 
     Joensuun 
Yliopisto 
    
 Yhteiskuntapolitiikan laitos 
 
 
Professori Mikko A. Salo   yht. yo Arttu Puhakka 
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VASTAUSOHJE: 
Jokaisen väitteen vieressä on asteikko yhdestä viiteen. Ympyröi mielipidettäsi 
vastaava vaihtoehto. 
1 = Kyllä, olen vahvasti samaa mieltä, 2 = Olen samaa mieltä, 3 = En osaa sanoa, 4 = 
En ole samaa mieltä, 5 = Ei, vastustan jyrkästi 
 
 
1. Jokaisen kansakunnan pitäisi olla vapaa ja itsenäinen. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Vapaiden ja itsenäisten kansakuntien pitäisi olla tasa-arvoisia. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Kansakunta voi käyttää itsemääräämisoikeuttaan vain omalla 
alueellaan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Kansakunnat ovat tasa-arvoisia osapuolia tekemissään 
sopimuksissa. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Kansakunnalla on oikeus itsepuolustukseen. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Kansakunnalla ei ole oikeutta käydä sotaa. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Ainoa oikeutettu syy käydä sotaa on ihmisoikeuksien 
puolustaminen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Vain ihmisoikeusloukkaukset oikeuttavat kansakunnan 
puuttumaan toisen kansakunnan sisäisiin asioihin. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Jos kansakunta on vastuuttomasti hoitanut aluettaan, ja alue on 
tuhoutunut, kansakunnalla ei ole oikeutta sodan avulla hankkia 
lisää alueita korvatakseen tuhoutuneita alueitaan 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Jos kansakunta on vastuuttomasti hoitanut aluettaan, ja alue on 
tuhoutunut, kansakunnalla ei ole oikeutta siirtyä ilman lupaa 
toisen kansakunnan alueelle korvatakseen tuhoutuneita alueitaan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Kansakunnan pitää noudattaa tekemiään sopimuksia. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Kansakunta on vastuussa teoistaan. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Kansakunnan pitää noudattaa sovittuja sodankäynnin sääntöjä. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Kansakunnan pitää kunnioittaa ihmisoikeuksia. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Ihmisoikeudet ovat yleismaailmallisia ja uskonnollisten ja 
filosofisten oppijärjestelmien yläpuolella. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Jokaisella ihmisellä pitäisi olla oikeus elämään ja 
turvallisuuteen. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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17. Jokaisella ihmisellä pitäisi olla oikeus henkilökohtaiseen 
omaisuuteen.  
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jokaisella ihmisellä pitäisi olla yhdistymisvapaus. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Jokaisella ihmisellä pitäisi olla oikeus lähteä maasta. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Jokaisella ihmisellä pitäisi olla oikeus tasa-arvoiseen 
kohteluun. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Jokaisella ihmisellä pitäisi olla uskonnon ja omantunnon 
vapaus. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Kansakunnalla ei ole oikeutta rikkoa rajojensa sisällä olevan 
vähemmistön ihmisoikeuksia. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. Kansakuntien pitäisi auttaa toisiaan nälänhädän ja kuivuuden 
uhatessa. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Kansakunnalla pitäisi olla oikeus saada apua, jotta se 
saavuttaisi sellaiset  olosuhteet, jotka mahdollistavat 
kansainvälisen lain noudattamisen ja ihmisoikeuksien 
kunnioittamisen.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Opiskelupaikka ja laitos: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Kansalaisuus:__________________________________________________________ 
Maat, joissa olet asunut pitempään kuin viisi vuotta: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Ikä:__________________________________________________________________ 
Sukupuoli:____________________________________________________________ 
Uskonto: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
   KIITOKSIA VASTAUKSISTASI !!! 
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Appendix 6. Logistic regression. 
 
     
Variable Peoples are free and equal (Q1) Peoples are equal to freedom and 
independence (Q2) 
No self-determination by 
subjugating other peoples (Q3) 
People are equal and parties in 
their agreements (Q4) 
People have the right of self-
defence (Q5) 
 B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig 
Nationality 
(American) 
 0.2017  0.6397  0.1371  0.0249  0.1557 
  Finnish -1.885 
(1.1406) 
0.0938 -0.4119 
(0.9709 
0.6714 0.0479 
(0.8545) 
0.9553 0.9075 
(0.8630) 
0.2930 -0.7439 
(0.9192) 
0.4183 
  Norwegian -0.3129 
(1.3144) 
0.8118 -0.1200 
(1.0590 
0.9098 -0.5949 
(0.8223) 
0.4694 -0.2843 
(0.7572) 
0.7073 -1.1372 
0.9300) 
0.2214 
  German -1.8653 
(1.1603) 
0.1079 -0.4984 
(0.9742) 
0.6089 -0.6661 
(0.7969) 
0.4032 0.5574 
(0.7153) 
0.4359 -0.4836 
(0.9360) 
0.6053 
  Polish 7.1779 
(21.4016) 
0.7373 0.8981 
(1.0507) 
0.3927 1.5892 
(0.9688) 
0.1009 1.2073 
(0.7741) 
0.1189 1.2597 
(1.0611) 
0.2352 
  Tanzanian -0.8269 
(1.3445) 
0.5385 0.7186 
(1.3375) 
0.5911 -0.4689 
(0.8995) 
0.6021 -0.8781 
(0.7735) 
0.2563 -0.7835 
(1.0097) 
0.4377 
Age category (39-49)  0.9804  0.3062  0.8158  0.7967  0.3140 
  Age 28-38 -0.0186 
(1.2918) 
0.9885 1.8645 
(1.5635) 
0.2330 -0.3432 
(1.2129) 
0.7772 0.6094 
(1.0180) 
0.5494 -0.8205 
(1.2104) 
0.4978 
  Age 17-27 0.0921 
(1.1938) 
0.9385 0.2245 
(1.1640) 
0.8470 -0.0341 
(1.1470) 
0.9763 0.6399 
(0.9495) 
0.5003 -0.0586 
(1.1477) 
0.9593 
Sex (male)           
  Female -0.1048 
(0.5181) 
0.8397 0.4953 
(0.5732) 
0.3876 -0.1745 
(0.4375) 
0.6900 0.2236 
(0.4007) 
0.5769 -0.2524 
(0.4654) 
0.5876 
Religion (Chrsitian)  0.9742  0.9238  0.7631  0.7357  0.9559 
  Muslim 8.2081 
(66.3752) 
0.9016 5.5015 
(23.5268) 
0.8151 0.2821 
(1.2081) 
0.8154 0.0628 
(0.9677) 
0.9483 0.1456 
(1.2337) 
0.9061 
  Atheist -0.1174 
(0.6115 
0.8477 0.2414 
(0.7470) 
0.7466 -0.3623 
(0.5251) 
0.4902 -0.3950 
(0.5080) 
0.4368 0.1637 
(0.5859) 
0.7799 
Constant 6.0937 
(22.4142) 
0.7857 4.6190 
(7.8597) 
0.5567 1.7767 
(0.5730) 
0.0019 1.1563* 
(0.4679) 
0.0135 1.9512 
(0.5852) 
0.0009 
-2Log Likelihood 114.214  107.783  166.853  194.342  151.598  
Nagelkerke R^2 0.244  0.111  0.125  0.150  0.113  
*Significant at p-value 0.05 
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Variable People have no right to war (Q6) Only legitimate ground for war is 
violation of human rights (Q7) 
Only legitimate ground for 
intervention is violation of human 
rights (Q8) 
No right to make up 
irresponsibility by conquest (Q9) 
No right to make up 
irresponsibility by migrating 
(Q10) 
 B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig 
Nationality 
(American) 
 0.4961  0.8699  0.4798  0.0000  0.0000 
  Finnish 0.6276 
(0.7150) 
0.3801 0.2142 
(0.6062) 
0.7239 -0.1298 
(0.6018) 
0.8292 3.5396* 
(0.9481) 
0.0002 2.8305* 
(0.8165) 
0.0005 
  Norwegian 1.3496 
(0.7233) 
0.0621 -0.1569 
(0.6457) 
0.8080 0.1973 
(0.6248) 
0.7522 0.8402 
(0.6824) 
0.2182 0.1568 
(0.6802) 
0.8177 
  German 0.5470 
(0.7009) 
0.4351 -0.1325 
(0.6037) 
0.8263 -0.3726 
(0.5973) 
0.5327 3.7356* 
(0.9305) 
0.0001 2.5897* 
(0.7625) 
0.0007 
  Polish 0.7971 
(0.6313) 
0.2067 -0.0750 
(0.5344) 
0.8885 0.4869 
(0.5199) 
0.3490 -0.5336 
(0.5604) 
0.3410 -0.3745 
(0.5569) 
0.5013 
  Tanzanian 0.4933 
(0.7906) 
0.5326 -0.6443 
(0.7124) 
0.3658 0.1168 
(0.6606) 
0.8597 -1.1723 
(0.8341) 
0.1599 -0.5090 
(0.7099) 
0.4734 
Age category (39-49)  0.7347  0.4350  0.9313  0.4241  0.7773 
  Age 28-38 6.7823 
(13.7160) 
0.6210 0.7464 
(0.9276) 
0.4210 -0.0570 
(0.8598) 
0.9472 1.2751 
(1.1997) 
0.2879 0.6280 
(0.9652) 
0.5153 
  Age 17-27 6.5505 
(13.7125) 
0.6329 0.3053 
(0.8791) 
0.7284 0.0770 
(0.8076) 
0.9240 1.4440 
(1.1233) 
0.1986 0.6416 
(0.9052) 
0.4785 
Sex (male)           
  Female 0.1238 
(0.3355) 
0.7122 -0.0023 
(0.3202) 
0.9944 -0.1303 
(0.3135) 
0.6777 -0.0388 
(0.4147) 
0.9255 -1.1138* 
(0.3803) 
0.0034 
Religion (Chrsitian)  0.6656  0.9155  0.9230  0.6914  0.2286 
  Muslim 0.2945 
(0.9787) 
0.7635 0.3434 
(0.9750) 
0.7247 0.3290 
(0.9115) 
0.7181 0.4084 
(1.2762) 
0.7489 0.6199 
(1.0531) 
0.5561 
  Atheist 0.3862 
(0.4497) 
0.3904 -0.0971 
(0.4451) 
0.8274 -0.0705 
(0.4390) 
0.8725 -0.4591 
(0.5857) 
0.4330 -0.9039 
(0.5648) 
0.1095 
Constant -2.7932 
(4.5830) 
0.5422 -0.5638 
(0.4408) 
0.2008 -0.2549 
(0.4146) 
0.5387 -0.0318 
(0.5589) 
0.9546 0.3037 
(0.4750) 
0.5227 
-2 Log Likelihood 248.829  270.375  282.276  187.155  212.081  
Nagelkerke R^2 0.091  0.022  0.032  0.520  0.412  
*Significant at p-value 0.05 
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Variable Peoples are to observe treaties and 
undertakings (Q11) 
Peoples are responsible for their 
actions (Q12) 
Peoples are to observe restrictions 
on the conduct of war (Q13) 
Peoples are to honor human rights 
(Q14) 
Human rights are independent 
from any philisophical 
doctrine(Q15) 
 B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig 
Nationality 
(American) 
 0.0964  0.9325  0.0611  0.4813  0.1199 
  Finnish 1.6633 
(1.2463) 
0.1820 -0.4328 
(1.2483) 
0.7288 0.0584 
(0.6423) 
0.9276 -0.1960 
(1.3247) 
0.8824 0.9240 
(0.6837) 
0.1765 
  Norwegian 0.8025 
(0.8737) 
0.3584 -0.5007 
(1.2463) 
0.6878 -0.5806 
(0.6543) 
0.3750 -0.9184 
(1.3155) 
0.4851 1.3197 
(0.7809) 
0.0911 
  German 1.3454 
(1.0877) 
0.2161 -0.9013 
(1.2021) 
0.4534 0.2591 
(0.6551) 
0.6925 1.2124 
(1.5898) 
0.4457 1.2363 
(0.6845) 
0.0709 
  Polish 8.4060 
(21.3763) 
0.6941 -0.0599 
(1.2006) 
0.9602 1.3439 
(0.6430) 
0.0366 1.0860 
(1.4682) 
0.4595 0.4943 
(0.5589) 
0.3765 
  Tanzanian 0.0005 
(0.9952) 
1.0000 -0.4901 
(1.3362) 
0.7138 0.0703 
(0.7358) 
0.9238 -0.4126 
(1.3200) 
0.7546 -0.2215 
(0.6923) 
0.7490 
Age category (39-49)  0.9730  0.6154  0.6683  0.5204  0.2892 
  Age 28-38 0.2958 
(1.3990) 
0.8325 0.9944 
(1.3204) 
0.4514 0.8257 
(0.9216) 
0.3703 1.4902 
(1.6222) 
0.3583 0.7159 
(1.0097) 
0.4783 
  Age 17-27 0.2944 
(1.2670) 
0.8162 0.3437 
(1.1517) 
0.7654 0.6325 
(0.8397) 
0.4513 0.1817 
(1.2329) 
0.8828 -0.0293 
(0.9300) 
0.9749 
Sex (male)           
  Female 0.0873 
(0.5966) 
0.8837 0.6677 
(0.5530) 
0.2273 -0.3306 
(0.3707) 
0.3725 1.2327 
(0.7646) 
0.1069 0.7867* 
(0.3811) 
0.0390 
Religion (Chrsitian)  0.7797  0.4181  0.7636  0.0837  0.6239 
  Muslim -0.3771 
(1.2947) 
0.7709 5.7857 
(24.3524) 
0.8122 -0.2599 
(0.9920) 
0.7933 -2.2821 
(1.1595) 
0.0490* -0.5548 
(0.9276) 
0.5497 
  Atheist -0.4609 
(0.6965) 
0.5082 -0.8147 
(0.6276) 
0.1942 -0.3251 
(0.4676) 
0.4869 1.0927 
(1.1965) 
0.3611 0.4676 
(0.6290) 
0.4572 
Constant 3.2062 
(3.6167) 
0.3754 4.1906 
(8.1291) 
0.6062 0.7352 
(0.4464) 
0.0995 2.8049 
(0.7506) 
0.0002 1.1350* 
(0.4693) 
0.0156 
-2 Log Likelihood 103.206  118.667  219.978  76.293  215.379  
Negelkerke R^2 0.275  0.091  0.130  0.203  0.146  
*Significant at p-value 0.05 
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Variable Everyone has the right to life and 
security (Q16) 
Everyone has the right to personal 
property (Q17) 
Everyone has the right of 
association (Q18) 
Everyone has the right to 
emigration (Q19) 
Everyone has the right to formal 
equality (Q20) 
 B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig 
Nationality 
(American) 
 0.9815  0.1304  0.0655  0.0632  0.8648 
  Finnish -7.6673 
(57.6352) 
0.8942 -0.4190 
(0.9577) 
0.6618 0.5166 
(0.6741) 
0.4435 1.1909 
(0.6715) 
0.0762 -0.1330 
(1.0248) 
0.8968 
  Norwegian -8.7209 
(57.6318) 
0.8797 -1.7767 
(0.9198) 
0.0534 0.9268 
(0.7414) 
0.2113 0.2866 
(0.6729) 
0.6701 -0.6592 
(1.0411) 
0.5266 
  German -8.7209 
(57.6324) 
0.8856 -0.0305 
(1.0124) 
0.9760 1.4516 
(0.7651) 
0.0578 2.2181* 
(0.7963) 
0.0053 0.3383 
(1.1323) 
0.7651 
  Polish 0.1298 
(67.3224) 
0.9985 7.9848 
(21.3320) 
0.7082 -0.2941 
(0.5525) 
0.5945 0.5176 
(0.5327) 
0.3313 7.6951 
(21.0044) 
0.7141 
  Tanzanian -8.2260 
(57.6386) 
0.8865 -0.4788 
(1.0779) 
0.6569 0.9826 
(0.8322) 
0.2377 1.1183 
(0.7442) 
0.1329 -0.6866 
(1.0708) 
0.5214 
Age category (39-49)  0.3570  0.6130  0.2871  0.1274  0.2062 
  Age 28-38 1.1987 
(1.5238) 
0.4315 0.4344 
(1.1050) 
0.6942 0.9924 
(1.0056) 
0.3237 1.8918 
(0.9339) 
0.0428 2.4985 
(1.4124) 
0.0769 
  Age 17-27 1.8656 
(1.3576) 
0.1694 0.8235 
(0.9810) 
0.4012 0.2071 
(0.8997) 
0.8180 1.4069 
(0.8426) 
0.0950 1.2373 
(0.9885) 
0.2107 
Sex (male)           
  Female -0.5902 
(0.9502) 
0.5345 -0.2120 
(0.5238) 
0.6856 0.2213 
(0.3824) 
0.5627 -0.0062 
(0.3765) 
0.9869 0.0945 
(0.6433) 
0.8832 
Religion (Chrsitian)  0.8091  0.9344  0.6823  0.1473  0.6881 
  Muslim 8.2323 
(110.3202 
0.9405 8.3483 
(66.7905) 
0.9005 5.3047 
(14.9297) 
0.7224 -1.5589 
(0.9768) 
0.1105 -0.2905 
(1.3079) 
0.8243 
  Atheist 0.7828 
(1.2106) 
0.5179 0.2105 
(0.6076) 
0.7290 -0.4317 
(0.5410) 
0.4249 0.6303 
(0.5926) 
0.2875 0.7432 
(0.9067) 
0.4124 
Constant 8.1289 
(38.4502) 
0.8326 5.7105 
(22.5480) 
0.8001 3.0970 
(4.9863) 
0.5345 0.4563 
(0.4512) 
0.3118 3.5200 
(3.5600) 
0.3228 
-2 Log Likelihood 45.013  119.401  206.804  215.175  90.396  
Nagelkerke R^2 0.193  0.261  0.131  0.160  0.201  
*Significant at p-value 0.05
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Variable Everyone has right to formal 
equality (Q20) 
Everyone right to liberty of 
cosncience and religion (Q21) 
People have no right to violate 
human rights of its minority (Q22) 
Agree on provisions for mutual 
aid (Q23) 
Assistance in the case of 
unfavourable conditions (Q24) 
 B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig B 
(S.E.) 
Sig 
Nationality 
(American) 
 0.8648  0.3373  0.2259  0.3606  0.2086 
  Finnish -0.1330 
(1.0248) 
0.5968 0.391 
(1.5043) 
0.7954 0.4665 
(0.9168) 
0.6109 1.3832 
(0.9771) 
0.1569 1.1721 
(0.6818) 
0.0856 
  Norwegian -0.6592 
(1.0411) 
0.5266 -1.609 
(1.2905) 
0.4110 0.0805 
(0.9249) 
0.9306 0.6558 
(0.9717) 
0.4997 0.3095 
(0.6612) 
0.6397 
  German 0.3383 
(1.1323) 
0.7651 -0.7909 
(1.2841) 
0.5380 0.7075 
(0.9216) 
0.4427 9.2771 
(37.8475) 
0.8064 0.5919 
(0.6215) 
0.3408 
  Polish 7.6951 
(21.0044) 
0.7141 0.7807 
(1.4495) 
0.5902 1.6490 
((0.9807) 
0.0927 1.8735* 
(0.9066) 
0.0388 1.2874* 
(0.5752) 
0.0252 
  Tanzanian -0.6866 
(1.0708) 
0.5214 -1.5609 
(1.2676) 
0.2182 -0.4683 
(0.9056) 
0.6051 0.3426 
(0.9459) 
0.7172 0.5703 
(0.7031) 
0.4173 
Age category (39-49)  0.2062  0.8662  0.9931  0.4078  0.7111 
  Age 28-38 2.4985 
(1.4124) 
0.0769 8.4728 
(22.9192) 
0.7116 -0.0960 
(1.2693) 
0.9397 9.5923 
(35.7992) 
0.7887 0.0471 
(0.9613) 
0.9609 
  Age 17-27 1.2373 
(0.9885) 
0.2107 0.5046 
(1.2407) 
0.6842 -0.0279 
(1.1747) 
0.9810 1.3118 
(0.9950) 
0.1874 0.3554 
(0.9068) 
0.6951 
Sex (male)           
  Female 0.0945 
(0.6433) 
0.8832 0.3153 
(0.6694) 
0.6377 0.6179 
(0.5439) 
0.2559 0.2189 
(0.6748) 
0.7456 -0.0426 
(0.3644) 
0.9069 
Religion (Chrsitian)  0.6881  0.9787  0.8717  0.6407  0.6144 
  Muslim -0.2905 
(1.3079) 
0.8243 -0.2271 
(1.3140) 
0.8628 6.7908 
(24.4116) 
0.7809 9.0776 
(104.0152) 
0.9305 -0.2037 
(0.9730) 
0.8342 
  Atheist 0.7432 
(0.9067) 
0.4124 -0.1108 
(0.8628) 
0.8979 0.3327 
(0.7485) 
0.6567 1.1380 
(1.2111) 
0.3474 0.5061 
(0.5288) 
0.3386 
Constant 3.500 
(3.5600) 
0.3228 4.9371 
(7.6556) 
0.5190 4.4052 
(8.1495) 
0.5888 9.1292 
(37.2074) 
0.8062 0.9180 
(0.4567) 
0.0444 
-2 Log Likelihood 90.396  86.304  128.034  83.992  228.786  
Nagelkerke R^2 0.201  0.196  0.121  0.269  0.059  
*Significant at p-value 0.05 
 
